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Received academic wisdom holds that human judgment is charac-
terized by unrealistic optimism, the tendency to underestimate the
likelihood of negative events and overestimate the likelihood of
positive events. With recent questions being raised over the degree
to which the majority of this research genuinely demonstrates
optimism, attention to possible mechanisms generating such a bias
becomes ever more important. New studies have now claimed that
unrealistic optimism emerges as a result of biased belief updating
with distinctive neural correlates in the brain. On a behavioral
level, these studies suggest that, for negative events, desirable
information is incorporated into personal risk estimates to a
greater degree than undesirable information (resulting in a more
optimistic outlook). However, using task analyses, simulations,
and experiments we demonstrate that this pattern of results is a
statistical artifact. In contrast with previous work, we examined
participants’ use of new information with reference to the norma-
tive, Bayesian standard. Simulations reveal the fundamental diffi-
culties that would need to be overcome by any robust test of
optimistic updating. No such test presently exists, so that the best
one can presently do is perform analyses with a number of tech-
niques, all of which have important weaknesses. Applying these
analyses to five experiments shows no evidence of optimistic
updating. These results clarify the difficulties involved in studying
72 P. Shah et al. / Cognitive Psychology 90 (2016) 71–127human ‘bias’ and cast additional doubt over the status of optimism
as a fundamental characteristic of healthy cognition.
 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
For over 30 years it has been an accepted ‘fact’ that humans are subject to a consistent bias when
estimating personal risk. Research suggests that people underestimate their chances of experiencing
negative events (with respect to their estimates of the average person’s risk), and overestimate their
chances of experiencing positive events (e.g., Harris & Guten, 1979; Weinstein, 1980, 1982, 1984,
1987). Hence researchers in this area have concluded that ‘‘people have an optimistic bias concerning
personal risk” (Weinstein, 1989, p. 1232). This pattern of optimistic self-estimates has been termed
‘unrealistic optimism’, and is commonly thought to reflect a self-serving motivational bias (for a
review, see Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001; but see also Chambers & Windschitl, 2004).
Unrealistic optimism has attracted a great deal of academic interest both from multiple domains
within psychology (including social psychology, judgment and decision-making, and cognitive neuro-
science) and from economics (see e.g., van den Steen, 2004). This research has also been used in var-
ious applied domains including clinical psychology where it has been proposed that an optimistic bias
is a necessary requirement to guard against depression (see Taylor & Brown, 1988). Within health psy-
chology, unrealistic optimism is used to explain the failure of individuals to undertake health protec-
tive behaviors (e.g., van der Velde, Hooykaas, & van der Joop, 1992; van der Velde, van der Pligt, &
Hooykaas, 1994) and to resist changes in diet (Shepherd, 2002), on the grounds that personal risk esti-
mates of obesity-related diseases are underestimated (see Miles & Scaife, 2003). Within the financial
sector, unrealistic optimism has been linked to economic choice (HM Treasury Green Book, n.d.; Puri &
Robinson, 2007; Sunstein, 2000) and it has been suggested as one of the factors behind the financial
crisis experienced in the first decade of the 21st Century (Sharot, 2012). Most recently, attention has
turned to investigating the neural correlates underlying the phenomenon (Chowdhury, Sharot, Wolfe,
Düzel, & Dolan, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, Korn, Chowdhury, & Dolan, 2012;
Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012; Sharot, Korn, & Dolan, 2011; Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007; see
Sharot, 2012).1.1. Detecting optimism: the comparison method
A recent analysis, however, has cast doubt over the evidential basis for unrealistic optimism. Harris
and Hahn (2011) argued that methodological and conceptual limitations of studies investigating this
phenomenon mean that results may be better explained as a statistical artifact rather than unrealistic
optimism (for a critique and counter-critique, see Hahn & Harris, 2014; Shepperd, Klein, Waters, &
Weinstein, 2013). Harris and Hahn demonstrated that it was possible for perfectly rational (non-
optimistic) agents to generate personal risk estimates that would be classified as unrealistically opti-
mistic given the paradigms and scoring methods used in the vast majority of unrealistic optimism
studies. Specifically, unrealistic optimism is usually studied by asking participants to compare
(directly or indirectly) their chance of experiencing a negative life event with the chance of the aver-
age individual (‘the comparison method’). The typical result is that, at a group level, participants’ aver-
age estimates of their own risk are significantly lower than the group average. Harris and Hahn,
however, showed that when the negative events are rare (i.e., have a base rate of less than 50% within
the population, as is almost always the case in optimism studies), three statistical factors, namely,
attenuated response scales, under-sampling of population minorities, and regressive population base
rate estimates, can cause completely rational groups of agents to produce the pattern of empirical
results that has been taken to indicate unrealistic optimism. This methodological failing means that
the results of past studies using the comparison method (i.e., the majority of research on optimism
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mistically biased can no longer be considered a settled question. Harris and Hahn (2011) thus suggest
that rather than being a distinguishing feature of healthy human thought (e.g., Sharot, 2012; Taylor &
Brown, 1988), ‘unrealistic optimism’ may purely be a statistical artifact resulting from flawed empir-
ical methodologies.
Crucially, the statistical artifact account is valence independent; it relies solely on the frequency of
the events to be judged and not on whether the effect equates to optimism or pessimism. Therefore
judgments in which one’s own chance is estimated to be lower than the average person’s chance
should also be observed when relatively rare positive events are estimated. However, because experi-
encing positive events is a desirable result, the same pattern of responding would traditionally be
interpreted as unrealistic pessimism. In contrast, an unrealistic optimism account would suggest that
one’s own ‘risk’ of experiencing positive events is judged to be higher than that of the average person.
Thus, the inclusion of rare positive events is a critical test for distinguishing genuinely optimistic
responding from potentially artifactual optimism using the comparison method. Studies that have
included such events have found a pattern of responding that is inconsistent with an optimistic bias,
but is consistent with the statistical artifact account: lower estimates of one’s own risk for both pos-
itive and negative events (Chambers, Windschitl, & Suls, 2003; Harris, 2009; Kruger & Burrus, 2004;
Moore & Small, 2008).
1.2. The update method
The majority of evidence for unrealistic optimism is based on the flawed comparison method. This
means that, despite the considerable amount of research on the topic over the last 30 years, further
empirical work is required to firmly establish the phenomenon. Moreover, even if unrealistic opti-
mism does exist, the use of the flawed comparison method in the majority of research aimed at under-
standing the factors that influence it means that we have considerably less knowledge about its
potential causes and moderators than widely thought.
It is therefore of note that a recent series of high-profile studies (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett &
Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn, Sharot, Walter, Heekeren, & Dolan, 2014; Kuzmanovic,
Jefferson, & Vogeley, 2015, 2016; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012; Sharot,
Kanai, et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2011) has purported to extend the understanding of unrealistic opti-
mism by investigating how an optimistic bias might be maintained. In these studies, pioneered by
Sharot and colleagues, researchers asked their participants to estimate their chance of experiencing
a series of negative events and then gave them the population base rates (hereafter ‘base rates’) of those
events, that is, participants were told the probability with which these negative events are experienced
by the average individual. Subsequently, participants were asked to re-estimate their own chance of
experiencing the negative life events. The degree to which participants updated their personal risk esti-
mates (i.e., the difference between their initial and second estimate of personal risk) was measured.
Participants updated their estimates significantly more in response to desirable information (informa-
tion suggesting that the base rate of the negative event, and hence average person’s risk, was lower than
the participant’s personal risk estimate) than they updated their estimates in response to undesirable
information (information suggesting that the base rate of the negative event was higher than that esti-
mated by the participant). This pattern of results led the researchers to infer that participants were
selectively incorporating new information in order to maintain an optimistic outlook. Functional Mag-
netic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) revealed that activity in right inferior frontal gyrus predicted updating
in response to undesirable information, while activity in medial frontal cortex/superior frontal gyrus
and right cerebellum predicted updating in response to desirable information (Sharot et al., 2011).
1.3. Existence of unrealistic optimism
These recent findings on belief updating are of great interest for two reasons. Firstly, in the light of
critiques of unrealistic optimism research (Harris & Hahn, 2011), these results might be seen to tip the
balance of evidence further toward the widespread presence of unrealistic optimism in everyday life. If
people revise their beliefs more in response to desirable than undesirable information, this would nec-
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eventsmore likely to happen to them than negative events of equal probability. Information that lowers
the probability of a negative event is desirable, but that same lowering is undesirable in the context of
positive events (which we do want to experience). Selective updating in response to desirable as
opposed to undesirable information would thus necessarily leave estimates of otherwise matched pos-
itive events higher than their negative counterparts. This in itself would constitute unrealistic optimism
(Lench & Ditto, 2008). In other words, selectively underweighting undesirable information relative to
desirable information will lower estimates of negative events and inflate estimates of positive events.
Thiswould alsomake it surprising if unrealistic optimismwere not observed in future comparative tests
of optimism that effectively control for the confounds identified in Harris and Hahn (2011).
1.4. Mechanisms of unrealistic optimism
Secondly, Sharot et al. provide evidence for a mechanism by which unrealistic optimism might
emerge or persist. It has long been held that unrealistic optimism reflects motivated reasoning that
serves to promote psychological (Taylor & Brown, 1988, 1994) and physical (Sharot, 2012) well-
being. Yet it has often been left unspecified what form exactly such motivated reasoning might take.
Hence the question of mechanism has continued to loom large. Some researchers have argued for non-
motivated mechanisms leading to unrealistic optimism, such as egocentricism (e.g., Chambers et al.,
2003) and ‘differential regression’ (Moore & Small, 2008; see also, Moore & Healy, 2008). Though these
mechanisms may on occasion give rise to optimism, because they do not reflect a motivational, or
valence-based, bias, they may in other cases give rise to pessimism. This challenges the contention
that people are generally over-optimistic. It also challenges the contention that optimism promotes
well-being, as both optimism and pessimism are then secondary characteristics of healthy human
thought. There have been some more detailed accounts of motivated reasoning (e.g., Critcher &
Dunning, 2009; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Lench & Bench, 2012), though much of their
application has been in other domains, such as self-perceptions of skill or attractiveness, not optimism
about future life events (but see e.g., Ditto, Jemmott, & Darley, 1988; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Lench &
Ditto, 2008). Moreover, many of these accounts view the impact of motivation in guiding the depth
and scope of cognitive processing, not as a directly biasing force per se (see also Kunda, 1990). This
restricts the circumstances in which optimistic conclusions will be attainable, and thus sits uneasily
both with the idea that unrealistic optimism is a pervasive bias and that it exists because it has adap-
tive value (see also, Hahn & Harris, 2014). As a consequence, selective belief updating potentially pro-
vides a long-missing, fully specified, process account of how unrealistic optimismmight come to be, in
addition to providing support for the very existence of the phenomenon itself. Thus, for both skeptics
and champions of unrealistic optimism, the degree to which people show evidence of optimistic belief
updating is of considerable interest.
1.5. Overview of the present paper
The current paper provides a detailed analysis of the claim for optimistic belief updating in the
form of: computational task analyses, simulations, and five experiments. The task analyses and sim-
ulations highlight flaws in the rationale of the update methodology. The experimental results demon-
strate that these flaws are consequential in experiments with human participants. The results from
these lines of enquiry converge to demonstrate that reports of optimistic updating reflect statistical
artifacts, rather than genuinely optimistic belief updating (as has been argued for demonstrations
of unrealistic optimism using the comparison method, Harris & Hahn, 2011).
Experiment 1 (Section 2) modifies the update method, first introduced in Sharot et al. (2011), to
examine updating in response to desirable and undesirable information for both negative and positive
events. Observed patterns of updating conform to the predictions of the ‘statistical artifact account’,
not optimistic updating. The possibility of an artifactual explanation for seemingly optimistic belief
updating is then pursued further by considering the way in which rational agents should update their
beliefs in response to new information, and then exploring the consequences of this for the update
method. It is demonstrated that the version of the update method used by Sharot and colleagues is
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ased’ belief updating can be obtained from a population of rational agents (Section 3). These simula-
tions also highlight the difficulty of conducting any robust test of bias in belief updating concerning
likelihood estimates for future life events. In light of these difficulties, the best one can presently do
is perform analyses with a number of techniques, all of which have important weaknesses. Experi-
ments 2, 3 (A & B) and 4 conduct such analyses (Sections 4–7), yielding no support for the notion
of optimistically biased belief updating.
2. Experiment 1
Experiment 1 provided a partial replication of an experiment using the update method (e.g., Sharot
et al., 2011). The update method was used to test for unrealistic optimism, but with two primary mod-
ifications. The first modification was the addition of positive events. Harris and Hahn (2011) showed
how the inclusion of positive events provides a simple test for artifactual optimism in the context of
the comparison method. For the new update method, the addition of positive events provides a similar
test for potential artifacts. Information is desirable with respect to negative events when it suggests
events are less probable than previously estimated. The converse is true for positive events;
information is desirable when it suggests events aremore probable than previously estimated. Chang-
ing one’s beliefs less in response to information suggesting the event is less probable than previously
estimated, and consequently under-estimating one’s personal chance of experiencing the event in
question, thus signals optimism only for negative events; for positive events, such under-estimates
signal pessimism. If belief updating truly reflects unrealistic optimism then it should be greater in
response to desirable information for both positive and negative events, even though this involves
deviation from the initial self estimate in opposite directions.
Readers familiar with Sharot et al. (2011; see also, Garrett & Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn
et al., 2014; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012) might point out that positive events
were included. Sharot and colleagues created positive events through asking participants to judge
the complementary likelihood of not experiencing each negative event, and found similar optimistic
updating to that found with the original wording. Such a result does not provide the critical test
required, however, since these ‘positive events’ will be exact complements of the negative events.
Consequently, any statistical mechanism that might be exerting an influence on the results of the neg-
ative events should exert exactly the opposite influence on these ‘positive events’ (e.g., if the overes-
timation of rare events is a contributing factor, then the complementary probability will be
underestimated) and the same pattern of results is predicted to be observed on any theory. This point
will be further clarified in discussion of the simulation data that follow (Section 3). A collection of dif-
ferent, genuinely positive, events is thus required.
The second modification we introduced concerned the base rates that were presented to partici-
pants. Sharot and colleagues (e.g., Sharot et al., 2011) used probabilities obtained from sources such
as the UK’s Office for National Statistics. These sources tend to be focused almost exclusively on neg-
ative events such as disease and divorce, making it difficult to obtain statistics for positive events. Fur-
thermore, we wished to manipulate the desirability of information presented to participants for
maximum experimental control. The base rates presented to participants in Experiment 1 were there-
fore derived from participants’ initial self-estimates (hereafter SE1s) for both positive and negative
events (see Section 2.1.3.1; see also, Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016). A funneled debrief procedure
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) was used to ensure that any participants who suspected that the probabil-
ities might be inaccurate were removed from the analysis. For consistency with previous literature,
and with Experiment 3 (Sections 5 and 6) which used externally sourced probabilities, the derived
probabilities of Experiments 1 and 2 will be referred to as ‘‘actual” probabilities.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Thirteen healthy participants (6 females; aged 19–28 [median = 20]) were recruited via the Birk-
beck Psychology participant database. Two additional participants were recruited and tested but were
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some of the base rates that were presented to them.1 Due to the association between unrealistic opti-
mism and depression (e.g., Strunk, Lopez, & DeRubeis, 2006), all participants were screened for depres-
sion using the Beck Depression Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) before completing the study. On
this measure no participant met accepted criteria for depression (M = 3.2, SE = 0.7). All participants gave
informed consent and were paid for their participation.
2.1.2. Stimuli
Eighty short descriptions of life events (see Appendix A), many of which had previously been used
in the study of unrealistic optimism (Lench & Ditto, 2008; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012; Sharot,
Kanai, et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2011; Weinstein, 1980), were presented in a random order. Half of the
events were positive and half negative. We limited the number of very rare or very common events.
The events for which base rates were available lay between 10% and 70% (M = 32.6, SD = 18.8; Office
for National Statistics and PubMed), providing participants with the opportunity to underestimate and
overestimate the likelihood of each event.
2.1.3. Procedure
The trial structure is shown in Fig. 1A. Each trial began with the presentation of text describing a life
event for 5 s, during which time participants were asked to imagine that event. Participants were then
instructed to estimate the likelihood of that event happening to them using a computer keyboard (the
Initial Self Estimate; SE1). If the participant did not respond within 5 s, the trial was omitted from
analysis (M = 1.9 trials per participant, SD = 2.0). A fixation cross was then displayed for 1 s, followed
by presentation of the event description accompanied by the base rate. This was described to
participants as the likelihood of that event occurring at least once to a person living in the same
socio-cultural environment as the participant (on derivation of base rates see ‘Section 2.1.3.1’). A
second fixation cross appeared for 1 s, after which the next trial began. Participants were instructed
that if they saw events which they had already experienced in their lifetime, they should estimate
the likelihood of that event happening to them again in the future. Eighty trials were presented in a
random order, comprising 20 trials involving positive life events accompanied by desirable information
concerning their likelihood, 20 trials involving positive life events accompanied by undesirable infor-
mation concerning their likelihood, 20 trials involving negative life events accompanied by desirable
information concerning their likelihood, and 20 trials involving negative life events accompanied by
undesirable information concerning their likelihood. These trials were preceded by two practice trials.
Participants estimated the probability of each event twice (see Appendix B, Table B1, for mean
estimates at each stage): once during the session described above and once in a second session
(henceforth, Second Estimate; SE2) that immediately followed the first, in which they were
again asked to estimate the probability of the event. The difference between SE1 and SE2 was taken
as the measure of the degree to which participants had updated their judgment of the event occurring
to them in their lifetime. The particular events associated with desirable or undesirable information
were randomized across participants.
2.1.3.1. Base rates. For each event, the average probability of that event occurring at least once to a per-
son living in the same socio-cultural environment as the participant was derived from the partici-
pant’s SE1 and presented to the participant as the actual event base rate. Probabilities were
computed according to the following formula: A random percentage between 17% and 40% (uniform
distribution) of the SE1 was either added to, or subtracted from, the SE1, according to trial type, and
rounded to the nearest integer. Thus, on positive desirable trials a random percentage of the SE1 was
added to the SE1, resulting in a derived probability indicating that the positive event was more likely
to occur than had previously been estimated. On positive undesirable trials a random percentage of
the SE1 was subtracted from the SE1, indicating that the positive event was less likely than had been
estimated. On negative desirable trials a random percentage of the SE1 was subtracted from the SE1,1 Including these participants in the analysis does not change the pattern, or statistical significance, of the results.
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Fig. 1. (A) Procedure for Experiment 1. On each trial participants were provided with one of 80 life events and instructed to
estimate the likelihood of that event happening to them. They were then given the ‘actual probability’ of that event. (B)
Procedure for Experiments 2–4. Procedure followed that of Experiment 1 but participants were also asked to provide a base rate
estimate.
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trials a random percentage of the SE1 was added to the SE1, indicating that the negative event was
more likely than had been estimated. To illustrate, were a participant to provide an SE1 of 25% in a
positive desirable trial, the provided base rate would lie between (25 + .17  25=) 29% and (25
+ .40  25=) 35%. All probabilities were capped between 3% and 77% (as is typical for studies using
the update method – e.g., Sharot et al., 2011) and participants were informed that this was the range
of possible probabilities.
2.1.3.2. Post experimental tasks. Participants completed two post-experimental tasks immediately after
the two sessions.
2.1.3.2.1. Memory errors. Participants were presented with each event again, in a random order,
and asked to recall the actual probability of each event. Memory errors were calculated as the absolute
difference between the recalled value and the actual probability.
2.1.3.2.2. Salience ratings. Participants were again presented with the events and were asked to rate
events on four scales: vividness (How vividly could you imagine this event? From 1 = not vivid to
6 = very vivid); prior experience (Has this event happened to you before? From 1 = never to 6 = very
often); arousal (When you imagine this event happening to you how emotionally arousing is the
image in your mind? From 1 = not arousing at all to 6 = very arousing); and magnitude of valence
(How negative/positive would this event be for you? From 1 = not strongly at all to 6 = very strongly).
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Scoring
For each event the amount of update was calculated first by computing the absolute difference
between the SE1 and the SE2, and second, by coding the difference as positive when the update
78 P. Shah et al. / Cognitive Psychology 90 (2016) 71–127was in the direction of the base rate and negative when the update was away from the base rate (e.g., if
SE1 was 40, base rate was 50, and the SE2 was 30, the update would be coded as 10, whereas if the
base rate had been 10 the update would be coded as +10). Thus, negative updates indicate updating in
the direction away from the actual base rate. Mean updates for each participant in each condition
were then calculated after removal of outliers (±3  the interquartile range) and trials for which a
derived probability could not be applied (e.g., when a participant’s SE1 was already at the lowest
extreme of the probability range, but the trial-type required that a lower base rate be supplied).2.2.2. Analysis of updates
Inspection of the mean updates (Fig. 2) revealed an asymmetry in the updating of likelihood esti-
mates with an interaction between the desirability of new information and the type of event (positive
or negative) that was judged. For negative events, the typical finding reported using the update
method (e.g., Sharot et al., 2011) was replicated. Participants updated their likelihood estimates more
in response to desirable than undesirable information. However, for positive events (which have not
previously been included in studies using the update method), the pattern of updating was reversed.
Participants updated their likelihood estimation more in response to undesirable than desirable infor-
mation. A pattern consistent with the optimism bias account (i.e., greater update in response to desir-
able information across both negative and positive events) was apparent in just one participant.
Mean updates were entered into a 2 (Event type: positive, negative)  2 (Desirability: desirable,
undesirable information) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Neither the main effect
of Event type (F < 1), nor Desirability (F < 1), was significant. However the interaction between these
factors was significant, F(1,12) = 29.39, p < .001, gp2 = .71. Paired sample t-tests indicated that this
interaction was due to participants updating significantly more in response to desirable than undesir-
able information when estimating the likelihood of negative events, t(12) = 4.73, p < .001, d = 1.70, but
significantly more in response to undesirable than desirable information when estimating the proba-
bility of positive events, t(12) = 2.78, p = .017, d = 1.20.Group mean 
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Fig. 2. Mean updates by Event type and Desirability – Experiment 1. Negative updates indicate updating in the direction away
from the actual probability. Error bars indicate ±1 standard error of the mean. *p < .05, two-tailed.
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itive and negative events. The replication of a desirability bias for negative events demonstrates that
the use of derived probabilities did not influence the way in which participants completed the task.
However, the presence of an undesirability bias for positive events is incompatible with an optimism
account. This is the major result from Experiment 1. The following analyses simply demonstrate that
the result is robust across all potential analyses, including those that control for the possible alterna-
tive explanations identified in Sharot et al. (2011), such as differential salience of desirable versus
undesirable information.
2.2.3. Additional analyses
2.2.3.1. Uncapped trials. In the typical design of the update method (e.g., Sharot et al., 2011), the num-
ber of trials in each cell of the experimental design cannot be controlled because whether the partic-
ipant receives desirable or undesirable information depends on their SE1. The use of derived
probabilities in the present study reduces this problem, but the use of capped probabilities (which
were included in order to follow as closely as possible Sharot et al.’s work in all other respects) means
that the number of trials per cell may become unbalanced. Since trials are ‘capped’ at the extreme ends
of the distribution, trials are lost when participants enter extreme values. This loss of trials is likely to
be unbalanced between conditions. To illustrate, should a participant enter an estimate of 77% (the
upper bound of allowed probabilities) then a derived probability on a positive desirable or negative
undesirable trial cannot be applied. The same is true for negative desirable and positive undesirable
trials when a participant’s SE1 is at the lower bound of the capped probability distribution (i.e., 3%).
Such extreme trials are excluded from the above analyses (Section 2.2.2) but a less severe problem
occurs when SE1s approach the extremes of the probability distribution and the program generates
a derived probability that is beyond the cap. The participant is subsequently presented with a ‘capped’
base rate (either 3% or 77%). It is possible for such trials to be unequally distributed across conditions,
and indeed this pattern was observed in the current data, as reflected in a significant interaction
between the Desirability and Event type factors in the number of capped trials, F(1,12) = 4.88,
p = .047, gp2 = .05. In order to guard against the differential updating reported above (Section 2.2.2)
being due to an unbalanced number of capped trials, a further ANOVA of mean updates excluded
all capped trials (see Appendix C). This analysis revealed the same pattern of significance as the anal-
ysis including capped trials, with a significant interaction between the Desirability and Event type fac-
tors, F(1,12) = 35.33, p < .001, gp2 = .75.
2.2.3.2. Analysis of initial estimates. Inspection of SE1s revealed that participants had a tendency to
assign significantly higher initial probabilities to positive events (M = 35.44, SD = 7.28) than negative
events (M = 29.55, SD = 11.62; t(12) = 2.48, p < .029, d = 0.61). In order to investigate whether the dif-
ferential pattern of updating reported above (Section 2.2.2) was simply due to the increased probabil-
ities assigned to positive events, a covariate coding for the mean difference in SE1s across desirable
and undesirable trials for positive and negative events was entered into the analysis of updates.2
The interaction between Desirability and Event type remained significant, F(1,11) = 17.33, p = .002,
gp2 = .61.3 There was still evidence for ‘optimistic’ updating for negative events, F(1,11) = 40.47,
p < .001, gp2 = .79, although the ‘pessimistic’ belief updating in response to positive events just failed to
attain statistical significance, F(1,11) = 4.03, p = .070, gp2 = .27.
2.2.3.3. Memory for probabilities. As noted in Sharot et al. (2011), it is possible that differential updating
as a function of the desirability of new information is caused by differential memory for desirable and2 An ANCOVA is functionally equivalent to including the control variable in a hierarchical regression, since they are both based
on the General Linear Model. In the 2  2 ANCOVA, the covariate was calculated as follows: (Positive Desirable SE1  Positive
Undesirable SE1)  (Negative Desirable SE1  Negative Undesirable SE1). In the separate ANCOVAs for positive and negative
events, the covariate was simply the calculation from the relevant of the two parenthesized subtractions.
3 With the present methodology, it is unnecessary to control for the absolute difference between the SE1 and base rate, because
this value is directly related to the initial SE1. Consequently, the present analysis controlling for SE1 renders controlling for such a
potential difference unnecessary.
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regardless of the valence of the event and desirability of the information. Analysis of memory errors
using a 2 (Event type)  2 (Desirability) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant main
effects nor interaction (Event type: F < 1, Desirability: F(1,12) = 3.79, p = .075, gp2 = .24, Event
type  Desirability interaction: F < 1).
2.2.3.4. Analysis accounting for all salience ratings. As a final check of the robustness of the interaction
between the Desirability and Event type factors in the analysis of updates, two further analyses were
conducted that included all salience ratings (see Appendix C) as covariates (i.e., reported magnitude of
event valence, vividness, arousal, and past experience; see Section 2.1.3.2.2). The interaction between
Event type and Desirability remained significant whether capped trials were included, F(1,8) = 15.97,
p = .004, gp2 = .66, or not, F(1,8) = 21.08, p = .002, gp2 = .73, whilst all main effects remained non-
significant (all Fs < 1).
2.3. Experiment 1 – discussion
Experiment 1 used a modified version of the update method to investigate the pattern of updating
seen in response to desirable and undesirable information when the likelihood of both negative and
positive events was estimated. It was found that the effect of information desirability on updating
was dependent on whether the event being judged was positive (i.e., something a person would want
to experience) or negative (i.e., something a person would not want to experience). For negative
events, using a paradigm in which it was possible to randomly allocate participants to receive either
desirable or undesirable information, we replicated the central finding from the update method
(Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett & Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014; Kuzmanovic
et al., 2015, 2016; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012; Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2011).
Participants updated their personal risk estimates more when provided with desirable information
than when provided with undesirable information when judging negative events (and, as in Sharot
et al., this result could not be explained in terms of differential event salience, initial probability esti-
mates, or memory). In contrast, participants updated their estimates more in response to undesirable
than desirable information when judging positive events. The results of Experiment 1 therefore
conflict with a general optimistic pattern of belief updating. They are, however, consistent with
previous data suggesting that ‘unrealistic optimism’ observed in standard, comparison tests of
unrealistic optimism is due to statistical artifacts (Harris, 2009; Harris & Hahn, 2011). How then might
this result be explained? To this end, the next Section 2.3.1 describes the normative process by which
one shouldmake estimates of personal risk. We subsequently report a series of simulations (Section 3)
that demonstrate how unbiased, completely rational, agents can produce the pattern of results
obtained in this experiment. The second set of simulations (Section 3.2) highlights the difficulties
associated with methods of measuring update bias, suggesting that no single measure can be
used to conclusively test for optimistic belief updating. In the further experimental sections
(Sections 4–7) we employ a triangulation approach to determine whether consistent evidence for
optimistic updating can be observed across a variety of (individually imperfect) analyses.
2.3.1. Optimism and the logic of risk estimates
Harris and Hahn (2011) showed that there are a number of statistical reasons why the standard
comparison method of measuring unrealistic optimism may give rise to seeming unrealistic optimism
at a population level even though no individual within that population is optimistic. Rather than
focusing on the difference between group and average risk, the update method introduced in
Sharot et al. (2011) focused instead on belief change, seeking to detect optimism in the way that peo-
ple revise their beliefs about risk in response to new information. To illustrate, consider the case in
which the national press reports that a deadly virus has found its way into the water supply. National
Newspaper A reports that their best estimate is that the virus will affect the water supply of 10% of
households in the country. National Newspaper B reports that their best estimate is that the virus will
affect the water supply of 30% of households in the country. Amanda reads Newspaper A, and Betty
reads Newspaper B. In the absence of any other information, Amanda’s best estimate of the chance of
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rate (as in Experiment 1 and Sharot’s research) of 20%, Amanda should increase her estimate by 10
percentage points and Betty should decrease her estimate by 10 percentage points, and thus their
absolute degree of belief updating should be equivalent. Any systematic difference in the amount of
update is evidence of bias.4
In general, however, there are two distinct ways in which we might receive new information about
our personal risk. We may receive new information about the prevalence or base rate (as above), but
we may also receive information diagnostic of our own personal risk (e.g., vaccination). Both of these
types of information are relevant, both can be desirable or undesirable, and, according to the norma-
tive procedure for determining risk, both should be combined via Bayes’ Theorem to provide our best
estimate of risk (e.g., Hardman, 2009; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In a population, some people will
have received a vaccination and thus be less at risk, whilst some people will not have received a vac-
cination and thus be more at risk than the base rate (because the base rate is the average across the
entire population). This fact has been recognized by optimism researchers for some time, and is the
very thing that makes optimism research so difficult:
‘‘A woman who says that her risk of heart disease is only 20% . . .may be perfectly correct when her
family history, diet, exercise, and cholesterol level are taken into consideration, despite the fact that
the risk for women in general is much higher”.
[Weinstein & Klein, 1996, p. 2]
Weinstein’s ‘comparative method’ was originally designed to overcome specifically this difficulty,
though in practice it fails to provide an adequate solution (see Harris & Hahn, 2011). The fact that the
normative best estimate of personal risk is a combination of both the average person’s risk (base rate)
and individual diagnostic information also affects the study of belief updating. The following example
(Section 2.3.2) outlines how a rational agent should update their risk estimates in light of new
information.
2.3.2. Normative risk updating
55-year-old Tim estimates that the average 55-year-old’s risk of contracting heart disease (the base
rate) is 20%. In the absence of any other information, Tim’s best estimate of his own likelihood of con-
tracting heart disease is 20%.
If Tim possesses any diagnostic information that differentiates his risk from the average person’s,
he should normatively combine the base rate with this diagnostic information. For example, if he does
not have a family history of heart disease, his risk is lower than the average person’s. Bayes’
Theorem prescribes how this information should be combined (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973):4 The
analysiPðhjeÞ ¼ PðhÞPðejhÞ
PðhÞPðejhÞ þ Pð:hÞPðej:hÞ ð1ÞBayes’ Theorem prescribes the probability, P(h|e), of experiencing an event h (e.g., heart disease) in
light of evidence e (no family history of heart disease). The best estimate of experiencing that event is
a function of the base rate of the event, P(h), and the diagnosticity of the evidence – the likelihood
ratio, PðejhÞPðej:hÞ. The likelihood ratio is the ratio between the conditional probability of obtaining the evi-
dence given that the hypothesis is true, P(e|h), and the probability of receiving it when the hypothesis
is false, P(e|:h). In Tim’s case, P(e|h) reflects how likely a heart disease patient is to have no family his-
tory of heart disease, whereas P(e|:h) reflects the probability of no family history of heart disease in
those who do not contract it. From a longitudinal study (Hawe, Talmud, Miller, & Humphries, 2003),
we can calculate P(e|h) = .52 and P(e|:h) = .66. As the likelihood ratio is less than one, such evidence
(no family history of heart disease) should decrease Tim’s estimate of contracting heart disease.
Specifically, Tim’s estimate of P(h) is 20% and therefore his best estimate of his chance of contracting
heart disease combines this with his specific diagnostic information to give:y may, of course, vary in the magnitude of their original mis-estimate, and this needs to be factored out in statistical
s.
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:2 :52þ :8 :66 ¼ 16% ð2ÞThe base rate of heart disease is actually 33% for 55 year-old males (Bleumink et al., 2004). If Tim
receives this information, he should recalculate his personal risk once more, using Bayes’ Theorem,
replacing his previous base rate estimate (20%) with 33%, which will result in an increased ‘best
estimate’::33 :52
:33 :52þ :67 :66 ¼ 28% ð3ÞGiven the two basic components to normative probability judgments – base rates and diagnostic
evidence – there are thus two ways to receive undesirable (desirable) new information: One can
receive new diagnostic information which suggests that one is more (less) at risk, or one may discover
that the base rate is higher (lower) than previously thought. Participants in all studies using the
update method (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett & Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al.,
2014; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012;
Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2011) and, following them, participants in the present Exper-
iment 1, did not receive any new diagnostic information. In Eq. (3), Tim knows the accurate base rate,
calculates his personal risk rationally, and yet his personal risk is different from the base rate. Individ-
uals should not necessarily change their estimate of personal risk simply because it lies above or
below the base rate. Researchers can only discern what effect the new base rate information should
have on a participant’s risk estimate if they know the participant’s previous estimate of the base rate.
Without this knowledge, it is impossible to classify a particular trial as ‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable’ and
therefore it is impossible to say in which direction (and how much) the participant’s estimate should
change. The following simulation highlights the flaws in the update method by simulating optimistic
data from non-biased agents.3. Simulation
3.1. The problem of misclassification
Take a hypothetical sample of 100 Bayesian agents, 25 of whom assume base rates of .1, .2, .3, and
.4, respectively (mean = .25) for Disease X, which has a true base rate of .25. Before the study, these
agents receive evidence reflecting their vulnerability to Disease X with the following characteristics:
P(e|h) = .5; P(:e|:h) = .9. Then P(h)P(e|h) + P(:h)P(e|:h) defines the proportion who receive evidence
suggesting increased risk, here: .25  .5 + .75  .1 = .2. Thus 20% of agents have evidence suggesting
they will get the disease (‘positive evidence’) and 80% have evidence suggesting they will not
(‘negative evidence’). So at each base rate, 5 agents will receive positive evidence, and 20 will receive
negative evidence.
In the simulated study (Table 1), agents calculate their initial risk estimates normatively via Bayes’
Theorem (Eq. (1)), using their subjective base rates; their second estimate recalculates Bayes’
Theorem using the experimenter-provided true base rate (as is exemplified in Eqs. (2) and (3)).5
Agents whose subjective base rate estimates were below the true base rate of .25 receive genuinely
undesirable information: Disease X is more prevalent than they thought. Agents whose subjective
base rate estimates were above the true base rate receive genuinely desirable information: Disease
X is less prevalent than they thought. However, Sharot et al.’s (2011) update method classifies infor-s assumes that the agents perceive the base rate information as maximally reliable. If the agents do not fully trust the
enter’ then their new base rate will deviate. In the extreme case in which agents believe the source of the information to
imally unreliable (i.e., one can infer absolutely nothing from the source’s report), one will see no asymmetric updating
one will observe no updating at all. In all other instances, the direction of the asymmetry will remain the same, it is only its
de that would change. The only situation in which this would not be the case would be if one built in an assumption
y the agents trusted information differently according to its desirability. This, however, would of course be a form of bias,
simulation would no longer be one of rational Bayesian agents, and the whole point of the simulation is to demonstrate
eemingly biased pattern of results can obtain from unbiased, rational Bayesian agents.
Table 1
Artifactual unrealistic optimism.
Note. Des = desirable information; Undes = undesirable information.
P. Shah et al. / Cognitive Psychology 90 (2016) 71–127 83mation as ‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable’ based on the relationship between initial estimate and true base
rate, thus misclassifying 30% of the sample (gray columns).
On that method, the final experimental ‘result’ is obtained by averaging across those agents receiv-
ing ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ information (see ‘Experimenter-defined Desirability’ in Table 1).
As each positive evidence group represents 5 agents, and each negative group 20 agents, the result-
ing absolute means are: Desirable Group = |0.04|; Undesirable Group = |0.03|. Thus, these rational
agents show ‘greater updating’ in response to ‘desirable’ than ‘undesirable’ information and would
be labelled optimistic – though rational by definition – due to incorrect classification. Although this
may seem a somewhat small effect, it becomes much more pronounced when base rate estimates
are regressive toward the midpoint of the scale (i.e., values below .5 are overestimated and values
above .5 underestimated), as is typical of people’s probability estimates in many contexts (see e.g.,
Harris & Hahn, 2011; Moore & Small, 2008, and references therein). If the true base rate were .21,
i.e., below the agents’ mean estimate, then the seeming difference in updating rises to 8% (‘desir-
able’ = .084; ‘undesirable’ = .004) – easily sizeable enough to account for extant experimental data
(e.g., Experiment 1; Section 2).
Fig. 3 demonstrates that this pattern of results is not dependent on the precise parameters used in
this illustrative example. The preponderance of positive differences in updating (where people update
more in response to desirable than undesirable information) is clear from both Fig. 3A (where mean
estimates of the underlying base rate are correct) and Fig. 3B (where base rate estimates are regres-
sive, and consequently represent more realistic simulations). Note that, were participants required
to estimate their chance of not experiencing the event (see e.g., Sharot et al., 2011), they would be esti-
mating P(:h). For rational Bayesians, all the probabilities would be complements of those in Table 1,
and if ‘rational’ updating appears biased in estimates of P(h), it will also appear biased in estimates of P
(:h). The direction of the asymmetry ‘flips’ above and below 50%, but because Sharot et al.’s comple-
ment events simultaneously flip the valence of the event, seeming ‘optimism’ is preserved.
Fig. 3 demonstrates two general characteristics: the fact that the mass of data points are above 0,
indicating seeming optimism, and the fact that the landscape contains many sharp boundaries. The
fact that these boundaries are so sharp is not only surprising, but also consequential. At these bound-
aries, a tiny change in either sensitivity, P(e|h), or specificity, P(:e|:h), of people’s diagnostic informa-
tion leads to significant change in update asymmetry. This explains how a non-selective change to a
probabilistically relevant quantity (e.g., changing the perceived diagnosticity of individuals’ evidence;
or altering the regressiveness of their initial base rate estimates) that affects all agents equally, can
lead to a seemingly selective effect: a sharp increase in the difference between updating for ‘desirable’
vs. ‘undesirable’ information. Thus, the selective effects of, for example, L-DOPA (Shah, 2012; Sharot,
Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012) on
belief updating might be entirely unrelated to optimism, and simply reflect (for example) better
learning (i.e., less conservative updating – formally equivalent to an increase in the diagnosticity of
information) following receipt of L-DOPA. Specifically, the z-axes of the landscape plots of Fig. 3 rep-
resent the difference in belief updating between desirable and undesirable trials. Looking at Fig. 3, one
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Fig. 3. Seemingly ‘optimistic’ updating. Positive values in the z-axes demonstrate ‘optimistic’ updating for Bayesian agents
receiving evidence with the properties shown in the x-axes, P(e|h), and y-axes, P(:e|:h). (A) Agents estimate the base rate as
either: .1, .2, .3, .4, and the true base rate = .25 (as in Table 1). (B) True base rate = .21. The mass of data points in both plots
spuriously suggests optimistic updating. Both landscapes are shown once from above and once from the front.
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and y-axes). Any movement within the parameter space will therefore affect the magnitude of this
observed difference. Crucially, this movement (reflecting a change in the underlying probabilistic
quantities) affects all agents in the simulations equally, thus an experimental manipulation which
affects the underlying probabilistic quantities (e.g., how diagnostic an agent considers a given piece
of evidence to be) for all agents equally will appear to have a differential impact on desirable and
undesirable trials. Consequently, the effect of such a manipulation will be manifest as a statistical
interaction between desirability and group effects (e.g., the administration vs non-administration of
L-DOPA). The mere fact that the desirability bias can be altered through TMS or other experimental
manipulations thus provides no independent evidence that the effect represents a genuinely opti-
mistic asymmetry. Rather, such effects are entirely compatible with the nature of the observed statis-
tical artifact. All that is required to obtain such effects is that the manipulation somehow influences
the probabilistically relevant quantities on which all agents base their judgments. A signature of such
an artifactual interaction is that it should arise in the same direction for positive and negative events,
such that both the seeming optimism (for negative events) and seeming pessimism (for positive
events) should diminish, or both together should increase. Harris, Shah, Catmur, Bird, and Hahn
(2013) show such a result with individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder.
The critique above seems to suggest a straightforward ‘fix’ of the updating method, namely the
inclusion of participants’ estimates of the average person’s risk. With this inclusion, enabling the cor-
rect definition of desirable and undesirable information, one might expect updating to be equal in
response to desirable and undesirable information, unless people were optimistically biased. How-
ever, this is not so. The combination of base rate error and diagnostic information presents more fun-
damental problems: even for correctly classified participants seeming updating asymmetries will
ensue. As Appendix D explains, this will be the case even where there is only a single diagnostic test
involved (as in Table 1), and these problems are compounded where participants vary in the diagnos-
tic information they possess. This is illustrated in the next section, Section 3.2, which demonstrates
why there is no quick ‘fix’ for the updating paradigm and clarifies the fundamental difficulties inherent
in assessing the rationality of belief updating.
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The preceding Section 3.1 outlines the conceptual issues involved in assessing optimistic belief
updating. It does not, however, address all measurement issues that are involved in an empirical
investigation of whether or not people’s belief updating is optimistically biased.
It is clear that two factors determine the beliefs of a rational agent: the base rate (average risk), and
whatever individual diagnostic knowledge that agent might possess. In a belief updating experiment
such as Experiment 1 or Sharot et al. (2011), the participants are only provided with new information
about the base rate by the experimenter, but it is participants’ revision of their beliefs about personal
risk that must be empirically assessed.
If rational agents possessed no diagnostic knowledge and base rate information was all they had to
go by, revision should normatively consist of moving to what they perceive the new base rate to be.
The amount of belief change will thus simply be the difference between the initial base rate estimate
and the revised base rate estimate. Trivially, however, the amount of belief change in rational agents
receiving ‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable’ information about the base rate will be the same only if the mag-
nitude of their initial estimation error is the same. Any analysis of actual updating behavior must thus
seek to control for differences in initial base rate error.
In their seminal paper, Sharot et al. (2011) conducted regression analyses to investigate the degree
to which initial errors predicted subsequent update – the term ‘learning score’ was used for these
regressions in Moutsiana et al. (2013; see also Garrett et al., 2014). Such an analysis might seem also
to be a way to control for differences in initial error. Sharot et al. regressed the amount of belief change
observed (i.e., the difference between first and second self-estimate) on the size of the initial error (in
this case defined incorrectly as the difference between initial self-estimate and true base rate). For
each participant in the study, two such regressions were conducted, comparing the events for which
the participant received ‘desirable’ versus ‘undesirable’ information. This yields two coefficients for
each participant, and the overall analysis simply compared the coefficients for statistical differences.
If participants had no diagnostic knowledge, and their self-estimates depended entirely on their
beliefs about the base rate, these regression-based analyses would be appropriate: whatever the size
of the initial error, it should be fully reduced on update, making the correlation between ‘initial error’
and ‘belief change’ a perfect correlation in a rational agent. However, this is no longer the case if par-
ticipants believe themselves to be in possession of individual diagnostic knowledge. As outlined in the
preceding Section 3.1, diagnostic knowledge means that an individual’s self-estimate need no longer
equal the base rate. From the perspective of the regression analyses Sharot et al. (2011) conduct, this
individual knowledge is simply ‘noise’ around the underlying base rate estimates. Unfortunately, this
‘noise’ is unlikely to simply ‘cancel out’ across conditions. In fact, diagnostic knowledge poses a prob-
lem even when ‘initial error’ is defined relative to the base rate (as is normatively appropriate) and the
regression is conducted between belief change concerning self risk and initial base rate error.
More specifically, the root of this problem is that in Bayes’ theorem (see above; Section 3.1) indi-
vidual diagnostic information combines multiplicatively with the base rate and is normalized to a
bounded scale between 0 and 1 (0% and 100%). This leads to systematic distortion the moment there
is variability in diagnostic knowledge across participants/life events.6 This distortion likely makes a
second, independent contribution to Sharot et al.’s (2011) result, over and above the issue of misclassi-
fication discussed in Section 2.3.1. This is demonstrated in Table 2, which shows an artificial sample of
participants that has been constructed to match exactly both base rate error (BR error) and diagnostic
information (LHR – likelihood ratio) across those receiving ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ information.
Specifically, there are 28 participants in each ‘group’. The ‘true’ base rate is 30%. For each partici-
pant in the ‘desirable information’ group there is one in the ‘undesirable information’ group whose
base rate error is exactly the same, except in sign (under- rather than over-estimating the base rate)
and who possesses the exact same amount of diagnostic knowledge (represented by the likelihood ratio).
The following columns then give, for each participant, their (rounded) estimates of the average per-6 Uniform diagnostic knowledge across all life events/persons would be fine as regression is a linear relationship that is
unaffected by multiplication of values by a constant (or addition of a constant).
Table 2
A perfectly matched sample for an updating experiment in which the true provided base rate is 30%.
Parameters Estimates
LHR BR error BR1 SE1 SE2 SE1 error Update
Desirable information 1.3 30 60 66 36 36 30
1.1 29 59 61 32 31 29
0.9 28 58 55 28 25 27
0.8 27 57 51 26 21 25
0.7 26 56 47 23 17 24
0.6 25 55 42 20 12 22
0.5 24 54 37 18 7 19
0.4 23 53 31 15 1 16
0.4 22 52 30 15 0 15
0.5 21 51 34 18 4 16
0.5 20 50 33 18 3 15
0.5 19 49 32 18 2 14
0.6 18 48 36 20 6 16
0.7 17 47 38 23 8 15
0.8 16 46 41 26 11 15
0.55 15 45 31 19 1 12
0.55 14 44 30 19 0 11
0.6 13 43 31 20 1 11
0.6 12 42 30 20 0 10
0.65 11 41 31 22 1 9
0.75 10 40 33 24 3 9
0.7 9 39 31 23 1 8
0.7 8 38 30 23 0 7
0.8 7 37 32 26 2 6
0.8 6 36 31 26 1 5
1.2 5 35 39 34 9 5
Undesirable information 1.3 30 1 1 36 29 35
1.1 29 1 1 32 29 31
0.9 28 2 2 28 28 26
0.8 27 3 2 26 28 24
0.7 26 4 3 23 27 20
0.6 25 5 3 20 27 17
0.5 24 6 3 18 27 15
0.4 23 7 3 15 27 12
0.4 22 8 3 15 27 12
0.5 21 9 5 18 25 13
0.5 20 10 5 18 25 13
0.5 19 11 6 18 24 12
0.6 18 12 8 20 22 12
0.7 17 13 9 23 21 14
0.8 16 14 12 26 18 14
0.55 15 15 9 19 21 10
0.55 14 16 9 19 21 10
0.6 13 17 11 20 19 9
0.6 12 18 12 20 18 8
0.65 11 19 13 22 17 9
0.75 10 20 16 24 14 8
0.7 9 21 16 23 14 7
0.7 8 22 16 23 14 7
0.8 7 23 19 26 11 7
0.8 6 24 20 26 10 6
1.2 5 25 29 34 1 5
Note. LHR = likelihood ratio, BR error = base rate error, BR1 = base rate estimate, SE1 = initial self estimate, SE2 = second self
estimate, SE1 error = difference between SE1 and true base rate.
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amount of belief change (Update; SE2–SE1). All participants’ estimates are normatively derived via
Bayes’ theorem.
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any real sample could ever hope to be) there are differences both in the amount of absolute belief
change and in the correlation between initial base rate error and belief change. The correlation
between initial base rate error and belief change for the ‘desirable information’ participants is .96,
but for the ‘undesirable information’ participants only .88 – even though all participants are updating
fully, in a normatively correct manner, and initial error and diagnostic knowledge are perfectly matched.
The situation is even worse if, following Sharot et al. (2011), the correlation is calculated between
‘SE1 error’ (the deviation between SE1 and true base rate) and belief change. In this case the correla-
tion for the ‘desirable information’ participants is .86, yet for the ‘undesirable information’ participants
it is .74. And this is without the additional problem of misclassification. In this hypothetical sample, all
participants have been classified appropriately relative to base rate error.
How can these discrepancies arise? And why are they more severe if the correlation is calculated
with the SE1 error as the reference point? The basis for this regression artifact lies in the compressed
nature of the probability scale illustrated in Fig. 4A and B. Correcting base rate error means moving
through this scale. However, those moving upwards to increase their estimates (on receiving ‘undesir-
able information’) are moving through a different part of the scale than those moving down.
To illustrate with an example: where the true base rate equals 30%, someone over-estimating that
base rate would, in the absence of diagnostic knowledge, move from 45% toward 30% on receiving the
desirable information, whereas someone who had underestimated by the same amount would move
from 15% to 30%. However, once both individuals are in possession of diagnostic knowledge (for exam-
ple they are less at risk, e.g., the likelihood ratio = 0.5) they would move from 29% to 17.6%, and 8% to
14% respectively. That is, the person in receipt of desirable information would (normatively) have to
move 12.4 percentage points, but the person receiving undesirable information would have to move
only 6 percentage points. The regression analysis, however, cannot ‘know’ this, because it does not
factor in diagnostic knowledge, and expects equal amounts of belief change from both.
The problem is aggravated where, as in Sharot et al.’s analyses, the calculation of initial error is
based on the self-estimate and not the base rate. Equal distance from the true base rate when
measured from self-estimates implies greater diagnostic knowledge for those below than above0
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Fig. 4. Probability scale compression. Panel A shows, along the x-axis, 10 different pairs of base rate and posterior probability
(y-axis). Across all 10 pairs the likelihood ratio, that is, the degree of individual diagnostic knowledge is the same, and the
posterior probability is derived, via Bayes’ theorem, by combining that diagnostic knowledge with the respective base rate.
Panel B highlights that a 10% difference in base rate above or below a reference base rate corresponds to different % changes in
posterior degree of belief.
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low’ the true base rate – given scale compression – one needs to be comparatively even less at risk rel-
ative to the average person. That is, one needs to possess even more diagnostic knowledge indicating
lower risk, and as a consequence, one should (normatively) exhibit even less belief updating. Norma-
tively, belief change depends on the multiplication of individual diagnostic information (the likelihood
ratio) with base rate information. Hence diagnostic information weights the impact of the base rate:
the more diagnostic the individual information is, the less influential the base rate is for the aggregate
judgment (e.g., a man without a bike cannot have it stolen no matter what the base rate is), and vice
versa.
So for two rational agents whose SE1s are the same absolute distance above and below the base
rate, the agent whose estimate lies below must, normatively, revise less on receipt of the new base
rate, because a smaller proportion of that agent’s individual risk derives from the base rate in the first
place, as long as base rate error is the same, and both agents are in receipt of diagnostic information
indicating less than average risk (as the majority of agents, in the case of events with frequency below
50%, will be). In other words, equating these agents whose initial self-estimates lie equally far above
and below the base rate brings about ‘asymmetric updating’ by mathematical necessity, if these agents
are matched on base rate error. The same is true if the diagnosticity of their individuating knowledge
is held constant, and base rate error is allowed to vary. It is simply impossible to match participants’
individual diagnostic information, participants’ base rate error and the amount by which they have to
update their beliefs. Only two of these three can be simultaneously matched across those receiving
desirable and undesirable information. Likewise, if one matches agents above and below the base rate
on their initial deviation from that base rate (SE1 Error), they must differ in either diagnosticity, base
rate error, or both. This can be seen by examining Table 2.
The majority of participants receive diagnostic information that indicates they are less at risk than
the average person, that is, they have likelihood ratios below 1 (give the base rate of 30%, 70% will not
go on to experience the event and the distribution of diagnostic knowledge must reflect that). Picking
out any two matched desirable/undesirable information participants shows the above effects. Com-
pare, for example, the third participant in each condition of Table 2: these two participants, by design,
are matched in likelihood ratio (LHR) and base rate error (BR Error). The ‘undesirable information’ par-
ticipant has greater SE1 Error than the ‘desirable information’ participant. In order to bring the ‘unde-
sirable information’ participant’s error in line with that of his desirable information counterpart, either
his base rate error has to be reduced or his likelihood ratio has to be made smaller (or both). Either of
these changes will mean that the ‘revised’, now matched in SE1 Error participant, should update less
on receiving the new base rate estimate.7
This affects not only the magnitude of absolute change but also correlations controlling for initial
error. And it affects not only conceptually problematic correlations between SE1 and update as con-
ducted by Sharot et al. (2011). It also affects more sensible attempts to factor out differences in initial
base rate error by correlating initial base rate error with update.
This is the problem underlying the perfectly matched sample of Table 2. The pernicious effect of
individual diagnostic information can be further illustrated with respect to this table: simply replacing
the four most extreme likelihood ratios in each group with a less diagnostic value (specifically, replac-
ing .4, .5, .5, and .5 with .7 in each group) reduces the difference in correlation between the two groups
from .12 to .09 (on Sharot’s correlation between SE1 and update) and from .08 to .06 (on the correla-
tion between initial base rate error and update).
This change illustrates also that the exact outcome of the regressions for participants receiving
desirable vs. undesirable information will depend on the exact degrees of diagnostic knowledge peo-
ple possess, even where that diagnostic knowledge and base rate error, and the pairing of diagnostic
knowledge and base rate error, have been exactly matched as in Table 2. The regression outcomes will
vary all the more with real samples, where base rate error, the degree of diagnostic knowledge, and its
distribution are all subject to sampling variability.7 The reverse happens where the LHR is greater than 1, that is, participants are in receipt of information indicating they are at
greater risk. The description also does not hold for those participants whose diagnostic information and base rate error is such that
the desirability of their new information would have been misclassified (see Section 3.1).
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stochastic and subject to variation. Specific combinations can generate both seeming ‘optimism’
and seeming ‘pessimism’ from entirely rational, fully updating, agents. While it is thus clear that
the regression analyses conducted in the majority of studies utilizing the update method (e.g.
Sharot et al., 2011) are statistically inappropriate, and their results are neither interpretable nor mean-
ingful with respect to the question of bias in human belief revision, one may still ask to what extent
regression artifacts will generate data patterns such as those Sharot et al. observed, beyond the con-
fines of carefully controlled hypothetical data sets such as Table 2. One may ask further to what extent
these artifacts persist even on the more sensible correlation between base rate error and update.
To this end we conducted Monte Carlo simulations of samples of rational, Bayesian agents who
update equally (namely fully) in receipt of desirable and undesirable information about the base rate.
Base rate error and ‘diagnostic knowledge’ were randomly generated and participants were classified
as receiving ‘desirable information’ or ‘undesirable information’. Specifically, the simulations allow
one to specify sensitivity and specificity of a diagnostic ‘test’, add Gaussian random noise in order
to generate variability across individuals, and to generate numbers of those receiving test results indi-
cating greater and lesser than average risk in accordance with the base rate (see Harris & Hahn, 2011).
We then evaluated the number of participants that are classified into both the ‘desirable information’
and the ‘undesirable information’ condition on both the normatively appropriate base rate classifica-
tion scheme and classification based on initial self-estimate. We then evaluated differences in initial
error and absolute belief change, and the resulting correlation between ‘initial error’ (on both mea-
sures of initial error: that is, deviation from self estimate, and deviation from base rate estimate)
and belief change.
Figs. 5 and 6 show sample runs of these simulations. Fig. 5 plots the results for agents with no diag-
nostic knowledge. In this case, all final self-estimates fall perfectly on the diagonal, indicating that
these agents have updated as much as they should on the basis of initial error (which in this case con-
sists only of base rate error by definition). Fig. 6 shows what happens to those same plots when diag-
nostic knowledge is incorporated into the update. First, the simulation replicates the main findingsBad News
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Fig. 5. Simulated rational participants with no individual diagnostic knowledge. The figure plots the (absolute) ‘error’ in initial
self estimate (SE1) as calculated by Sharot and colleagues (i.e., initial self-estimate – ‘true’ base rate) against (absolute) change,
that is, the difference between initial and final self-estimate. Separate markers represent the participants who received
desirable information upon hearing the true base rate, and those for whom this was undesirable information. As participants are
fully rational, all data points fall on the diagonal, giving rise to a perfect correlation between initial error and amount of change.
Fig. 6. Rational participants with diagnostic knowledge. The figure shows the impact of providing the same rational agents
shown in Fig. 5 with individual diagnostic knowledge. The top four rows show plots of belief update against error in initial self
estimate (SE1) as calculated by Sharot et al. (2011), that is, the difference between that self estimate and the true base rate. This
relationship forms the basis of Sharot et al.’s controls for differences in individual error via comparison of correlations for
‘desirable information’ and ‘undesirable information’ trials. In the bottom left panel, Column 1 shows Sharot correlations
resulting from correlation between absolute belief update and SE1 error for the simulated data shown in the panels above, with
blue = desirable information, green = undesirable information, and red = the difference between desirable and undesirable
information correlations. Note that the correlations shown are for the correctly classified participants only (rows 2 and 4). In the
bottom left panel, Column 2 shows the corresponding correlations between absolute belief update and initial base rate error.
The bottom right panel shows asymmetrically optimistic updating in terms of absolute updates. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
90 P. Shah et al. / Cognitive Psychology 90 (2016) 71–127from the update method (e.g., Sharot et al., 2011). In line with ‘optimistic updating’ the ‘desirable
information’ people show significantly greater absolute update than the ‘undesirable information’
people. Furthermore, those in receipt of ‘desirable information’ (indicated by circles, right hand side
of plot) show a greater correlation between initial error (relative to their initial self estimate as a ref-
erence point) and their update than those in receipt of ‘undesirable information’ (left hand side of the
plot). All of this occurs even though all agents in the simulation are, by design, rational and unbiased.
We next take the reader through Fig. 6 in more detail.
As a reminder, the normatively appropriate, correct, classification scheme classifies participants as
receiving desirable or undesirable information about the base rate from the experimenter according to
their initial base rate estimates, not according to whether or not the experimenter provided, ‘true’ base
rate is above or below their own initial self-estimate (SE1) as in the original update method (e.g.,
P. Shah et al. / Cognitive Psychology 90 (2016) 71–127 91Sharot et al., 2011, which we intentionally followed in Experiment 1). The top four rows of Fig. 6 con-
tain plots both of the simulated participant data with all participants in the sample (with N = 100 for
both ‘desirable information’ and ‘undesirable information’ conditions), and plots with only correctly
classified participants (‘desirable information’ = 82, ‘undesirable information’ = 80), in order to give
a feel for the overall distributions and how they are affected by misclassification (as already discussed
in Section 3.1).
Fig. 6 (bottom right panel) then shows clearly that the asymmetric updating effects are not solely
due to participants who are misclassified on the Sharot classification scheme discussed above. The
asymmetry in absolute change for those in receipt of desirable vs. those receiving undesirable infor-
mation (bottom right panel) is present both for all participants, and among the subset who are clas-
sified correctly.8
The crucial panel of Fig. 6, however, is the bottom left panel. Sharot et al. (2011) demonstrate a dif-
ference in correlation between initial and final estimates for ‘desirable information’ and ‘undesirable
information’ participants. The bottom left panel (‘Sharot scheme’) shows that the simulated data repli-
cate the differences in correlation between the two groups.
The correlation values plotted are based on correctly classified participants only. This demonstrates
clearly that the regression artifacts created by the failure to control appropriately for individual diag-
nostic knowledge provide a separate, independent basis for the seeming optimistic updating effect.
This also renders moot Garrett and Sharot’s (2014; see also Kuzmanovic et al., 2015) demonstration
(using negative life events) that updating asymmetries arise even where participants are correctly
classified.
Finally, Fig. 6 bottom left panel also shows why it is better to control for initial error by correlating
belief change with initial base rate error. In this particular simulation, the difference between ‘desir-
able information’ and ‘undesirable information’ correlations is halved. However, this does not fully
solve the problem: while correlations for ‘desirable information’ and ‘undesirable information’ people
will typically be more similar, as more meaningful quantities are being correlated (this is reflected also
in the correlations being higher overall), differences, and even statistically significant differences, can
remain.
Both types of ‘control’ for initial error are problematic because they do not factor in appropriately
the effects of individual diagnostic knowledge, and both can thus lead to seemingly optimistic updat-
ing. However, Monte Carlo simulations like the ones just described suggest that the differences in cor-
relation are typically much less marked when ‘initial error’ is defined appropriately, as is in fact
observed in Garrett and Sharot (2014, Fig. 3B, left panel).
Finally, it should be noted that the regression artifact need not always lead to seeming optimism.
Depending on the underlying characteristics of the diagnostic ‘test’ (that is, its sensitivity and speci-
ficity) and the base rate, other patterns can also ensue. There is thus not even an expectation that
Sharot et al.’s finding need replicate with other events.9
All of this raises the question of how one might test appropriately for optimistic belief updating.
Performing the regressions relative to the correct ‘initial error’ is better but itself imperfect. The only
fully appropriate solutions require factoring in diagnostic knowledge.
The simple addition of a base rate estimate (as already required for appropriate error calculation
and trial classification) does, however, allow one to estimate this diagnostic knowledge without
explicitly asking participants to provide yet another estimate. Specifically, one can calculate an implied
likelihood ratio from the base rate estimate and the initial self-estimate. Because Bayes’ theorem can be8 Note that this sample matches Sharot’s findings even in the fact that difference in absolute belief change between the two
groups is statistically significant, even though there is no significant difference in the ‘error’ (deviation from the base rate) of the
initial self-estimates (SE1 error).
9 For those interested in replicating these simulations, the parameters underlying this particular run were ‘true’, base rate was
30%, base rate error was slightly regressive overall at a mean estimated base rate (AV1) = 32%, sensitivity = .52, specificity, = .65,
with Gaussian noise withm = 0, sigma = .15. Finally, the script implemented Sharot et al.’s (2011) procedure of capping participant
responses to the range 3–77%. Neither regressive base rates, nor capping are necessary for data patterns such as these. However,
regressive base rate estimates seem to broaden the range of values for sensitivity and specificity under which the Sharot-style data
patterns are observed. The impact of capping, finally, varies with the base rate in question and how diagnostic individuating
information is.
92 P. Shah et al. / Cognitive Psychology 90 (2016) 71–127reversed (see Section 4.2.4), one can calculate what likelihood ratio would (normatively) have to be
present in order to arrive at the self-estimate provided, given the base rate the participant has esti-
mated. This likelihood ratio can then be combined with the new, ‘true’, base rate to derive a predicted
revised self-estimate, which can be compared with the actual revised estimate obtained.
Such a comparison is normatively appropriate. It should be acknowledged, however, that it may
suffer from potentially uneven effects of response noise, for the same reasons that diagnostic informa-
tion has uneven effects. Participants may misremember or mis-select output values, for example mis-
takenly typing ‘‘29” instead of ‘‘28”. However, a constant absolute amount of noise on the estimate
corresponds to a different proportion depending on where one is on the scale. This becomes apparent
simply by reversing the logic of Fig. 4: constant differences between values correspond to ever-
increasing differences in proportion as one approaches the end points of the scale. Moreover, noise
on response estimates arises not only through the pressures of the task, but is a feature of the fixed
resolution of the response scale. In rating tasks such as Sharot et al. (2011), participants are not free
to respond with any number they wish, but rather are limited to integer responses even if they were
able to resolve probabilities differing only in subsequent decimal points. Yet in terms of relative risk,
the difference between 3.2% and 1.5% corresponds to the same 10 percentage point drop in base rate as
does the difference between 23% and 19.7% for individuals in possession of exactly the same diagnos-
tic knowledge. And rounding has a correspondingly larger effect for the former than for the latter.
By the same token, a failure to update fully (as is, in fact, to be expected on the basis of the large
literature on ‘conservatism’ in human belief revision, e.g., Edwards, 1968; Phillips & Edwards, 1966),
may lead to different assessments when considered in terms of absolute differences in update (across
desirable and undesirable information trials) or in terms of ratios or proportions (i.e., actual belief
change as a proportion of the normatively mandated/predicted belief change).
In the studies described below (Sections 4–7), our strategy, in light of the various difficulties out-
lined thus far, will be to report the results of a range of possible analyses, across both positive and neg-
ative events, to fully test for the existence of optimistic belief updating. If there really is a genuine
optimistic bias (certainly an optimistic bias that could have any practical relevance) it should emerge
in consistent patterns across these various measures. Perhaps the strongest evidence for optimism
would be observed should the comparisons with Bayesian predictions consistently provide evidence
for optimistic belief updating. However, as outlined above, this should be consistent across both the
ratio measure and a difference measure, as either alone is compromised by different aspects of the
bounded probability scale. Table 3 provides a summary of results across all experiments reported in
this paper. We contend that it would take a very selective form of motivated reasoning to conclude
from these results that people typically update their risk estimates in an optimistic fashion. In all
but one study, the central ‘result’ reported from previous studies using the update method is
observed: seeming optimistic updating with negative events using the personal risk classification
scheme. This indicates that the different minor changes in method utilized across these studies do
not compromise that result. Crucially, however, once positive events are included, there is no consis-
tent evidence for optimism. For none of the studies does the pattern of results, across negative and
positive events, display any consistency across these event types or methods of analysis. The method-
ologies and results of these experiments are provided in further detail in Sections 4–7. Readers less
interested in the experimental details of these further studies are encouraged to skip to Section 7.3.
4. Experiment 2
Experiment 2 provided a replication of Experiment 1, but additionally elicited participants’ esti-
mates of the population base rate of each event (see Appendix B, Table B2, for mean estimates at each
stage). This enabled us to perform the analyses described in Section 3.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Seventeen healthy participants (9 females; aged 18–44 [median = 23]) were recruited via the Birk-
beck Psychology participant database. All gave informed consent and were paid for their participation.
Table 3
Results summary – Experiments 1–4.
Personal risk classification Base rate classificationa Significant
difference
between
classification
schemes?
Comparison with rational Bayesian predictions
Ratio measure Difference measure
Negative
events
Positive
events
Negative
events
Positive
events
Negative
events
Positive
events
Negative
events
Positive
events
Experiment 1 Optimism Pessimism N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Experiment 2 Optimism Pessimism n.s. n.s. Yes Optimism Pessimism Optimism Pessimism
Experiment 3A Optimism Pessimism n.s. n.s. Yes n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Experiment 3B Optimism Pessimism n.s. Pessimism Yes n.s. Pessimism n.s. n.s.
Experiment 4 n.s. Pessimism n.s. n.s. No (p = .08) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
a Note. Results are shown after controlling for initial error in base rate estimates.
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Eighty short descriptions of life events, the majority of which had been used in Experiment 1, were
presented in a random order. Again, half of the events were positive and half negative. The stimulus
set (Appendix E) was slightly altered from Experiment 1 in order to better equate SE1s (participants’
initial estimates of their own risk) for positive and negative events, and to reduce the number of
illness-related events. Very rare or very common events were again avoided.
4.1.3. Procedure
The procedure followed that of Experiment 1, except that participants were asked to provide a base
rate estimate (BR1) after estimating the probability of personally experiencing the event (see Fig. 1B).
All base rates were capped between 3% and 80% and participants were informed that this was the
range of possible probabilities. Participant feedback suggested that the 5 s presentation times in
Experiment 1 were excessively long and therefore presentation times were reduced to 4 s in Experi-
ment 2. The funneled debriefing, as implemented in Experiment 1, revealed that no participants sus-
pected that event base rates were derived from their SE1s.
4.2. Results and discussion
Our first analysis sought to probe broadly whether the differences between the two classification
schemes, the scheme used in Sharot et al. (2011), and the normatively appropriate scheme, were
empirically consequential by examining whether they led to significant differences in results. As a
reminder, Sharot et al. (2011) classified trials as involving ‘desirable’/’undesirable’ information relative
to the participant’s initial self-estimate (henceforth referred to as ‘personal risk classification scheme’),
whereas the normatively correct classification scheme bases classification on the relationship
between ‘actual base rate’ and the participant’s base rate estimate (henceforth ‘base rate classification
scheme’).
4.2.1. Comparison of the two classification schemes
A 3-way ANOVA across the two classification schemes demonstrated a 3-way interaction between
Classification Scheme, Event type and Desirability, F(1,16) = 11.42, p = .004, gp2 = .42. The Event
type  Desirability interaction was significantly smaller under the normatively appropriate base-
rate classification scheme than under the inappropriate personal risk classification scheme.
This will result from the fact that the use of the personal risk classification scheme will lead to mis-
classification of trials (see Section 3.1). This was investigated further by analyzing the number of trials
in each of the four cells of the design. While the personal risk classification scheme results, by exper-
imental design, in an even distribution across the four trial types (Fig. 7A), numbers vary under the
base rate classification scheme (Fig. 7B). When number of trials was entered into a Classification Sche-
me  Event type  Desirability repeated measures ANOVA, the 3-way interaction between the factors
was significant, F(1,16) = 49.95, p < .001, gp2 = .76, suggesting that a significant proportion of data-
points are misclassified on the personal risk classification scheme (as in the simulation with rational
agents, Table 1). Indeed, per participant, an average of 12/40 negative events and 8/40 positive events
were classified differently under the two classification schemes.
We next analyzed the results in more detail, starting with the normatively inappropriate personal
risk classification scheme (the method used in Experiment 1 and by Sharot and colleagues). This anal-
ysis tests the replicability of the pattern of results observed in Experiment 1, and checks that the inclu-
sion of questions about the events’ base rates did not alter the way in which participants estimated
their personal risk. As in Experiment 1, additional analyses including covariates coding for differences
in SE1s across positive and negative events, and for salience ratings, were conducted and produced the
same patterns of significance, as did analyses including only uncapped trials. These additional analy-
ses are therefore not reported further.
4.2.2. Analysis: personal risk classification scheme
When trials are classified according to the personal risk classification scheme, inspection of the
mean updates revealed the same pattern of updating seen in Experiment 1 (Fig. 8A), which was pre-
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Fig. 7. Mean number of trials by Event type and Desirability – Experiment 2. (A) Normatively inappropriate personal risk
classification scheme. (B) Normatively appropriate base rate classification scheme. Error bars indicate ±1 standard error of the
mean. *p < .05, two-tailed.
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Fig. 8. Mean updates by Event type and Desirability – Experiment 2. (A) Normatively inappropriate personal risk classification
scheme. (B) Normatively appropriate base rate classification scheme. No difference in updating was observed under the base
rate classification scheme after the degree of base rate estimation error was accounted for. Negative updates indicate updating
in the direction away from the actual probability. Error bars indicate ±1 standard error of the mean. *p < .05, two-tailed.
P. Shah et al. / Cognitive Psychology 90 (2016) 71–127 95sent in all participants. Average updates were entered into a 2 (Event type: positive, negative)  2
(Desirability: desirable, undesirable information) repeated measures ANOVA. Neither the main effect
of Event type, F(1,16) = 1.59, p = .23, gp2 = .09, nor that of Desirability, F(1,16) = 2.21, p = .16, gp2 = .12,
was significant.
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tion between the factors was significant, F(1,16) = 54.00, p < .001, gp2 = .77. This interaction was due to
participants updating significantly more in response to desirable than undesirable information when
estimating the probability of negative events, t(16) = 6.44, p < .001, d = 1.93, but significantly more in
response to undesirable than desirable information when estimating the likelihood of positive events,
t(16) = 5.64, p < .001, d = 1.88. All these results were unchanged when controlling for differences in
SE1s across conditions.
Experiments 1 and 2 therefore gave equivalent results when analyzed using the personal risk clas-
sification scheme. This replicates the standard findings observed with negative events (Chowdhury
et al., 2014; Garrett & Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015,
2016; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012; Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2011); but the oppo-
site pattern of results observed in response to positive events means that a general optimistic bias can-
not explain these results. Furthermore, these results demonstrate that requiring participants to
provide an estimate of base rates in this experiment did not affect participants’ pattern of belief
updating.
4.2.3. Analysis: base rate classification scheme
When trials are classified using the normatively appropriate base rate classification scheme, the
same pattern of differential updating seen in Experiment 1 is evident, but its magnitude is reduced
with respect to that observed using the personal risk classification scheme (Fig. 8B), and it is present
in fewer participants (65%).
Average updates were entered into a 2 (Event type)  2 (Desirability) repeated measures ANOVA.
Neither the main effect of Event type, F(1,16) = 2.92, p = .11, gp2 = .15, nor that of Desirability, F(1,16)
= 1.75, p = .21, gp2 = .10, was significant. The interaction between the factors was significant, F(1,16)
= 20.52, p < .001, gp2 = .56, reflecting significantly greater updating in response to desirable than unde-
sirable information when estimating the probability of negative events, t(16) = 3.45, p = .003, d = 0.96,
but significantly greater updating in response to undesirable than desirable information when esti-
mating the likelihood of positive events, t(16) = 4.05, p = .001, d = 1.08.
Although it is not a perfect test of optimistic belief updating (see Section 3.2), it is still of interest to
see if any evidence of selective updating remains once initial estimation error has been controlled for. A
covariate controlling for initial base rate estimation error was therefore included in the analysis.10 In
this ANCOVA, neither the main effects of Event type, F(1,15) = 2.15, p = .16, gp2 = .13 or Desirability
(F < 1), nor the interaction between these factors remained significant, F(1,15) = 1.85, p = .19, gp2 = .11.
Analyses of simple main effects revealed that the effect of Desirability was not significant when judging
either positive or negative events, F(1,15) = 1.70, p = .21, gp2 = .10; F(1,15) = 1.15, p = .30, gp2 = .07,
respectively.
4.2.4. Analysis: a comparison with rational Bayesian predictions
As mentioned at the end of Section 3, the addition of a base rate estimate enables the calculation of
an implied likelihood ratio:10 An
on the G
error 
rate est
relevanPosterior Odds ¼ Prior Odds LHR ð4Þ
) PðhjeÞ
1 PðhjeÞ ¼
PðhÞ
1 PðhÞ  LHR ð5Þ
) LHR ¼ PðhjeÞ
1 PðhjeÞ 
PðhÞ
1 PðhÞ ð6ÞANCOVA is functionally equivalent to including the control variable in a hierarchical regression, since they are both based
eneral Linear Model. In the 2  2 ANCOVA, the covariate was calculated as follows: (Positive Desirable base rate estimate
Positive Undesirable base rate estimate error)  (Negative Desirable base rate estimate error  Negative Undesirable base
imate error). In the separate ANCOVAs for positive and negative events, the covariate was simply the calculation from the
t of the two parenthesized subtractions.
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divided by 100, Eq. (6) can be written as:11 Not
infiniteLHR ¼ SE1
1 SE1
BR1
1 BR1 ð7ÞKnowing the diagnosticity of the evidence that participants believe they possess (which allows
them to differentiate their personal risk from the average person’s risk), one can calculate predicted
values of SE2, by using the provided base rate information and the calculated LHR to obtain the pos-
terior odds in Eq. (4). A predicted posterior is then obtained through dividing the posterior odds by (1
+ posterior odds). As an example, consider an individual estimated their own risk of contracting lung
cancer as 10% (SE1) and the average risk as 15% (BR1). Using Eq. (7), these responses imply a likelihood
ratio of: 0:110:1 0:1510:15 ¼ 0:63 The individual then learns that the base rate is actually 20%. From Eq. (5),
their predicted posterior odds are therefore: 0:210:2 0:63 ¼ 0:16, and therefore the predicted posterior
is: 0:161þ0:16 ¼ 0:14, or 14%.
Optimistic belief updating can then be tested for with either a difference measure (predicted belief
change  observed belief change) or a ratio measure (observed belief change  predicted belief
change). For the former measure, values closer to zero represent more normative belief updating,
whilst for the latter measure, values closer to one represent more normative belief updating. Both
measures are, however, susceptible to artifacts stemming from the bounded nature of the probability
scale given the potential for response noise (see Section 3.2 for more details).
4.2.4.1. Difference measure. The main effect of Event Type was not significant, F < 1, nor was the main
effect of Desirability, F(1,16) = 1.82, p = .20, gp2 = .10. The interaction between the two factors was sig-
nificant, F(1,16) = 25.00, p < .001, gp2 = .61. For negative events, participants were significantly less con-
servative in belief updating in response to desirable (M = 1.72 percentage points difference, SD = 1.95)
than undesirable (M = 7.62 percentage points difference, SD = 5.96) information, t(16) = 4.37, p < .001,
d = 1.12. With regard to positive events, the pattern reversed, as participants were significantly less
conservative in their updating in response to undesirable (M = 3.04 percentage points difference,
SD = 2.47) than desirable (M = 7.07 percentage points difference, SD = 4.55) information, t(16) = 3.83,
p = .001, d = 1.10.
4.2.4.2. Ratio measure. Care must be taken when aggregating across multiple trials with the ratio mea-
sure as the direction by which a participant differs from the normative change score will alter the
weight it is given if the trials are averaged by taking the mean. Should, for example, a participant
(for any reason, including keyboard error) update their belief ten times more than predicted, their
score on such a trial will be 10, whilst it will be 0.1 if they update their belief ten times less than pre-
dicted. Subsequently, the former error will be overestimated if ratios are aggregated across trials by
taking the mean. Consequently, for the ratio scores we calculated the median score across trials for
each participant and analyzed the data with separate non-parametric Wilcoxon tests for negative
and positive events.11 For negative events, there was a significant effect of Desirability (Z = 2.59,
p = .010), with less conservative updating in relation to desirable information (Median = 0.44;
IQR = 0.48) than undesirable information (Median = 0.00; IQR = 0.53). For positive events, there was a
significant effect of Desirability (Z = 2.69, p = .007), with significantly less conservative updating in rela-
tion to undesirable information (Median = 0.68; IQR = 0.37) than desirable information (Median = 0.16;
IQR = 0.37).
5. Experiment 3A
Experiment 2 both replicated the main finding of Experiment 1 (no evidence for a systematically
‘optimistic’ pattern of updating when both negative and positive events are considered) and enablede that some data points are lost in the ratio analysis, where the predicted change was zero (for which the ratio would be
).
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leagues’ studies (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett & Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al.,
2014; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012; Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2011), however,
Experiments 1 and 2 experimentally manipulated the degree to which participants were inaccurate
in their risk estimates by providing base rates derived from participants’ initial estimates of personal
risk (SE1). The consistency of the results using the personal risk classification scheme for negative
events across Experiments 1 and 2, and their consistency with the results reported by Sharot et al. sug-
gests that the use of such derived probabilities did not influence the pattern of results. It is, neverthe-
less, still possible that this experimental design may have either over- or underestimated the degree to
which using the personal risk classification scheme affects the degree of differential updating obtained
using the update method. For completeness therefore, as well as to test for asymmetric updating using
the normatively appropriate base rate classification scheme on more ecologically valid degrees of
accuracy in probability estimation, we used the same conceptual design as Experiment 2 but used
externally sourced probabilities, as in Sharot and colleagues’ research.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
Ninety-five UCL psychology undergraduates12 (76 female; aged 17–21 [median = 19]) participated in
Experiment 3A as part of a course requirement. Participants completed the study in two groups in
departmental computer laboratories.
5.1.2. Stimuli
Fifty-six (37 negative and 19 positive; Appendix F) life events were presented to participants in one
of two random orders. The 37 negative events and associated probabilities were provided by Sharot
and Korn and largely overlapped with those used in Sharot et al. (2011).13 The only changes made
to the events were to add the word ‘clinical’ to obesity (so as to reduce noise in interpretations of obesity)
and to present the three different types of cancer separately. The event ‘cancer’ was also included, with
an objective base rate of 40% in England and Wales (Office for National Statistics, 2000).
The positive life events were taken from a previous study (Harris, 2009), and were based on those
events used in Weinstein (1980). With the exception of ‘graduate with a first’, objective statistics were
not known for these events, but were taken from participants’ estimates in a previous study (Harris,
2009). From the recognition that such estimates are likely to be regressive – that is, less extreme (clo-
ser to 50%) than the true statistic (see e.g., Hertwig, Pachur, & Kurzenhäuser, 2005; Moore & Small,
2008), these mean values were then transformed by the equation x:15
:7 to obtain the estimates for
the true base rate for these events.14 Six of these events (marry a millionaire, have a starting salary
greater than £40,000, receive nationwide recognition within a profession, have an achievement recog-
nized in the national press, visit the Amazonian rainforest, have one’s work recognized with an award)
were too rare for this formula to be applied. An estimate that was less regressive (i.e., closer to zero) than
the value obtained in Harris’ (2009) data was estimated for these events. The statistic for ‘graduate with a
first’ (i.e. the highest possible undergraduate degree classification in the U.K.) was taken as the frequency
of first class degrees in the previous year’s graduating class (the statistics provided are shown in Appen-
dix F). Participants were informed that the statistics were ‘‘from a number of sources and are as reliable12 Experiment 3 was conceived independently (by AJLH) of Experiments 1 and 2 (PS & GB). Experiments 1 and 2 used a sample of
participants comparable in size to those in Sharot et al. (2011, N = 19; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012, N = 19 & 21; Sharot, Kanai,
et al., 2012, N = 10 in each of three experimental groups). Experiment 3 used fewer events than in Sharot et al. (2011) and
Experiments 1 and 2, and consequently used a greater sample size.
13 Experiment 3 used externally sourced probabilities that Korn had kindly provided AJLH for a previous study. Sharot
subsequently provided the probabilities used in the Sharot et al. (2011) study. Upon comparison, there was a large degree of
overlap (probabilities did not significantly differ, t(32) = 0.29, p = .77) but not 100% correspondence.
14 Harris and Hahn (2011) simulated regressive estimates using the formula, y = 0.7x + 0.15, which results in estimates (y) that
are more regressive than objective probabilities (x), but which equal the objective probability at 0.5. They cited evidence
(Clutterbuck, 2008, as cited in Harris & Hahn, 2011) to suggest that this degree of regression was psychologically plausible.
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were not therefore taken from external frequency data. It is, however, very difficult to see where one
could source such data (at least without an extensive social science survey). Whilst studies have inves-
tigated the objective accuracy of people’s estimates of the real-world frequency of negative life events
(e.g., Christensen-Szalanski, Beck, Christensen-Szalanski, & Koepsell, 1983; Hertwig et al., 2005;
Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978), we are unaware of any that have investigated
this question for positive events. This likely reflects the fact that base rate statistics for positive events
are not readily available. We therefore used the procedure above to estimate ostensibly sensible and reli-
able estimates for the base rates of the positive events.
5.1.3. Procedure
For each event, participants were asked to provide an estimate (as a percentage between 0% and
100%; see Appendix B, Table B3, for mean estimates at each stage) of how likely they thought the
event was to occur to them (SE1) and to the average first year UCL psychology student of their age
and sex (BR1). In contrast to most previous studies, participants were not constrained to report prob-
abilities in a fixed range only. Rather, participants were free to report a probability anywhere
between 0% and 100%, ensuring that participants could report their true beliefs. The order of ques-
tions, both the events and whether participants first estimated their own risk or the average person’s
risk, was counterbalanced across participants. The next screen informed participants of the actual
probability that the average first year psychology student would experience that event. To ensure
that they processed the information, the following screen asked participants to report the actual
probability they had just been given. If the participant entered an incorrect percentage, they were
informed that they were wrong, presented with the correct percentage, and required to input that
information. The study continued, with one positive event included after every two negative events,
until the participant had estimated all events. After rating all 56 events, participants were required to
provide a second estimate of their personal likelihood (SE2) and a second base rate estimate (BR2) of
experiencing that event. Participants were incentivized to pay attention through informing them that
one event would be drawn at random, and one individual whose second base rate estimate was clos-
est to the true value would receive £40. Following the study, participants were debriefed, and
informed of the perceived reliability of the sources of the base rate information. A week later, the ‘raf-
fle’ for the £40 was played in front of all participants, according to the rules above, and the winner
was paid in cash.
5.2. Results and discussion
Due to the free nature of participants’ responses, it was possible for them to provide percentages
that were either less than 0 or greater than 100. There were 6 instances of responses over 100, pre-
sumably due to input error. These cases were removed before further analysis. We also excluded trials
which were more than 3 interquartile ranges from the mean value from analyses. These exclusions
reduced the total number of trials across the four different conditions by approximately 2.5% (the pre-
cise number differs across the different classification schemes).
Once again, we first compared the results of the two classification schemes with a 3-way ANOVA,
finding a 3-way interaction between Classification Scheme, Event type and Desirability, F(1,93)
= 35.72, p < .001, gp2 = .28. The Event type  Desirability interaction effect was significantly smaller
under the base-rate classification scheme than the personal risk classification scheme, replicating
the result observed in Experiment 2. Furthermore, per participant, an average of 6/37 negative events
and 3/19 positive events were classified differently under the two classification schemes (i.e., misclas-
sified under the personal risk classification scheme).
5.2.1. Analysis: personal risk classification scheme
Mean updates using the personal risk classification scheme revealed the same asymmetry as
observed in Experiments 1 and 2 (Fig. 9A). Average updates were entered into a 2 (Event type: posi-
tive, negative)  2 (Desirability: desirable, undesirable information) repeated measures ANOVA. The
main effect of Desirability was significant, F(1,93) = 4.45, p = .038, gp2 = .05, but participants updated
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Fig. 9. Mean updates by Event type and Desirability – Experiment 3A. (A) Personal risk classification scheme. (B) Base rate
classification scheme. Experiment 3B (C) personal risk classification scheme. (D) Base rate classification scheme. Error bars
indicate ±1 standard error of the mean. *p < .05, two-tailed.
100 P. Shah et al. / Cognitive Psychology 90 (2016) 71–127more in response to undesirable information than to desirable information. The main effect of Event
type was also significant, with participants updating their estimates about positive events more than
negative events, F(1,93) = 13.34, p < .001, gp2 = .13.
Once again, there was a flip in asymmetric updating across negative and positive events: the sig-
nificant interaction between Event type and Desirability observed in Experiments 1 and 2 was repli-
cated in Experiment 3A, F(1,93) = 32.15, p < .001, gp2 = .26. When judging negative events, participants
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p = .001, d = 0.56), but updated significantly more in response to undesirable information than to
desirable information when judging positive events, t(94) = 5.25, p < .001, d = 0.75. As in Experiments
1 and 2, these three critical results remain significant when including a covariate controlling for the
initial difference between SE1 and the base rate.5.2.2. Analysis: base rate classification scheme
The pattern of differential updating is reduced when trials are classified using the normatively
appropriate base rate classification scheme (Fig. 9B). Average updates were entered into a 2 (Event
type)  2 (Desirability) repeated measures ANOVA. The main effect of Desirability was significant, F
(1,94) = 13.33, p < .001, gp2 = .125 (updates were greater for undesirable information), the main effect
of Event type approached significance, F(1,94) = 3.80, p = .054, gp2 = .04, and there was a trend toward
an interaction between Event type and Desirability, F(1,94) = 2.96, p = .089, gp2 = .03. When estimating
the likelihood of negative events, participants updated equally in response to desirable and undesir-
able information, t(94) = 0.77, p = .44, d = 0.12. When estimating the likelihood of positive events, par-
ticipants updated significantly more in response to undesirable than desirable information, t(94)
= 3.27, p < .001, d = 0.46.
Thus, when trials were classified according to the base rate classification scheme, no evidence of
unrealistic optimism was found, although seeming ‘pessimism’ was observed when judging positive
events. To control for the difference in initial base rate errors, the covariate coding for base rate esti-
mation error was again included in the analysis. After inclusion of this covariate, the Event
type  Desirability interaction was non-significant (F < 1), but the main effect of Desirability remained
significant, F(1,93) = 8.08, p < .01, gp2 = .08.5.2.3. Analysis: comparisons with rational Bayesian predictions
5.2.3.1. Difference measure. There was a main effect of Event Type, F(1,94) = 14.89, p < .001, gp2 = .14,
such that participants’ belief updating was less conservative for positive events (M = 4.2 percentage
points difference, SE = 0.6) than negative events (M = 6.1 percentage points difference, SE = 0.4). There
was no main effect of Desirability, F(1,94) = 2.75, p = .10, nor was there an Event Type  Desirability
interaction (F < 1). These results were the same when positive and negative events were analyzed sep-
arately (all ps > .25).5.2.3.2. Ratio measure. Separate Wilcoxon related-samples signed rank tests were carried out for neg-
ative and positive events. For negative events, there was no effect of Desirability (Z = 0.27, p = .79),
with a trend for less conservative updating in relation to undesirable information (Median = 0.55;
IQR = 0.64) than desirable information (Median = 0.48; IQR = 0.77). For positive events, there was
again no effect of Desirability (Z = 1.26, p = .21), with the same trend of less conservative updating
in relation to undesirable information (Median = 0.78; IQR = 0.59) than desirable information (Med-
ian = 0.56; IQR = 1.00).5.3. Experiment 3A summary
Experiment 3A included events with externally sourced actual probabilities and observed no evi-
dence for optimistically biased belief updating. Previously, we noted one potential limitation of Exper-
iment 3A, which was that (with the exception of ‘graduate with a first’) our base rate estimates for
positive events were not based on objective frequency data. The consistency of the pattern of results
observed across the experiments reported here and in previous studies using the update method,
using different methods of generating base rate data for positive events, suggests that this did not
affect our findings.
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6.1. Method
Experiment 3B was a direct replication of Experiment 3A, undertaken a year later. The only differ-
ence was the precise demographics of the sample, who again were UCL undergraduates participating
as part of a course requirement. 112 participants (91 female; aged 17–22 [median = 19]) were in
Experiment 3B.
6.2. Results and discussion
As in Experiment 3A, responses greater than 100 (n = 4) were removed before further analysis. We
also excluded trials which were more than 3 interquartile ranges from the mean value for that exper-
imental cell from analyses. These exclusions (plus those where a trial could be classified as neither
positive nor negative) reduced the total number of trials across the four different conditions by
approximately 2.5%.
Wefirst compared the results of the two classification schemeswith a 3-wayANOVA, finding a3-way
interaction between Classification Scheme, Event type and Desirability, F(1,110) = 20.68, p < .001,
gp2 = .16. The Event type  Desirability interaction effect was significantly smaller under the base-rate
classification scheme than the personal risk classification scheme, replicating the result observed in
Experiments 2 and3A.With respect tomisclassification (Section 3.1), an average of 5/37negative events
and3/19positive events per participantwere classifieddifferently under the two classification schemes.
6.2.1. Analysis: personal risk classification scheme
Mean updates using the personal risk classification scheme revealed the same asymmetry as
observed in Experiments 1, 2 and 3A (Fig. 9C). Average updates were entered into a 2 (Event type: pos-
itive, negative)  2 (Desirability: desirable, undesirable information) repeated measures ANOVA. The
main effect of Desirability was significant, F(1,111) = 6.57, p = .012, gp2 = .06, but, as in Experiment 3A,
participants updated more in response to undesirable information than to desirable information. The
main effect of Event type approached significance, with participants trending to update their esti-
mates about positive events more than negative events, F(1,111) = 3.35, p = .07, gp2 = .03.
Once again, there is a flip in asymmetric updating across negative and positive events: the signif-
icant interaction between Event type and Desirability observed in the previous experiments was repli-
cated in Experiment 3B, F(1,111) = 62.73, p < .001, gp2 = .36. When judging negative events,
participants updated more in response to desirable information than undesirable information, t
(111) = 5.12, p < .001, d = 0.77, but updated significantly more in response to undesirable information
than to desirable information when judging positive events, t(111) = 6.93, p < .001, d = 0.93. As in
Experiments 1, 2 and 3A, these three critical results remain significant when including a covariate con-
trolling for the initial difference between SE1 and the base rate.
6.2.2. Analysis: base rate classification scheme
The pattern of differential updating is reduced when trials are classified using the normatively
appropriate base rate classification scheme (Fig. 9D). Average updates were entered into a 2 (Event
type)  2 (Desirability) repeated measures ANOVA. The main effect of Desirability was significant, F
(1,110) = 12.85, p = .001, gp2 = .11 (again updates were greater for undesirable information), as was
the Event type  Desirability interaction, F(1,110) = 28.28, p < .01, gp2 = .21. When estimating the like-
lihood of negative events, participants updated more in response to desirable than undesirable infor-
mation, t(111) = 2.04, p = .044, d = 0.29. When estimating the likelihood of positive events, participants
updated more in response to undesirable than desirable information, t(110) = 5.58, p < .001, d = 0.71.
As in previous experiments, the covariate coding for the difference in initial base rate estimation
error was again included in the analysis. In this experiment, inclusion of this covariate did not alter
the pattern of results in the overall ANCOVA, with the corrected pattern of means still in the direction
of pessimism in the overall ANCOVA (undesirable: M = 9.56; desirable: M = 7.40). Critically, the only
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ative events, F(1,110) = 3.55, p = .06.
6.2.3. Analysis: a comparison with rational Bayesian predictions
6.2.3.1. Difference measure. There was a main effect of Event type, F(1,110) = 7.90, p = .006, gp2 = .07,
such that participants’ belief updating was less conservative for positive events (M = 5.2 percentage
points difference, SE = 0.6) than negative events (M = 6.7 percentage points difference, SE = 0.4). The
effect of Desirability did not reach the conventional level of significance, F(1,110) = 3.72, p = .056,
gp2 = .03, but the trend was for participants to be less conservative in their updating in response to
desirable (M = 5.4 percentage points difference, SE = 0.5) than undesirable (M = 6.5 percentage points
difference, SE = 0.5) information. There was no Event type  Desirability interaction (F < 1). There was
no significant effect of Desirability when negative and positive events were analyzed separately,
although, for negative events, the less conservative updating in response to desirable information
approached significance, t(111) = 1.95, p = .054, d = 0.22, although note the potential for an inflated
Type I error rate with such an analysis in the absence of significant results in the overall ANOVA.
6.2.3.2. Ratio measure. Separate Wilcoxon related-samples signed rank tests were carried out for neg-
ative and positive events. For negative events, there was no effect of Desirability (Z = 1.30, p = .19),
with a trend for less conservative updating in relation to desirable information (Median = 0.60;
IQR = 0.51) than undesirable information (Median = 0.42; IQR = 0.72). For positive events, there was
a significant effect of Desirability (Z = 2.93, p = .003), but the effect was for less conservative updating
in relation to undesirable information (Median = 0.77; IQR = 0.73) than desirable information (Med-
ian = 0.28; IQR = 0.88).
7. Experiment 4
The results of all four experiments have been broadly consistent (see Table 3). Whilst Experiments
3A and 3B used externally sourced probabilities, Experiments 1 and 2 derived base rates from initial
self estimates. Experiment 4 derived the base rates from initial base rate estimates and also attempted
to match the subjective frequency of the positive and negative events as much as possible.15
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Participants
Thirty-two healthy participants (28 females; aged 18–27 [median = 19]) were recruited via the
University of Surrey participant database. All gave informed consent and were paid for their
participation.
7.1.2. Stimuli
Forty short descriptions of life events (Appendix G), predominantly taken from Experiment 3, were
presented in a random order. The stimulus set was, however, altered so that half of the events were
positive and half negative, whilst better equating the base rates of positive and negative events.
Specifically, we used the 19 positive events from Experiment 3 (for which we had base rate estimates
– see Section 5.1.2). We then added one new positive event, for which there was frequency informa-
tion for the reference class of intended participants at the University of Surrey (i.e., ‘‘Professional or
managerial job after graduating” (45%); note we also had frequency information for the event ‘‘grad-
uating with a first” (23%), both from unistats.com). This resulted in 20 positive events. A research
assistant blind to the experimental hypotheses, with no knowledge of research on optimism bias,
was presented with these positive events (and their corresponding base rates – from estimates where
necessary, as in Section 5.1.2) and the complete list of negative events used across all experiments
(and their corresponding base rates). The research assistant removed events from the list of negative15 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this experiment.
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events: 22.85) and standard deviations (23.00; 23.40) were as closely matched as possible (p = .99).
7.1.3. Procedure
The procedure followed that of Experiment 2, except that the order in which the estimates were
provided was counterbalanced across participants (see Fig. 1B; see Appendix B, Table B5, for mean
estimates at each stage). Provided base rates were calculated as ±17–29% of the initial base rate esti-
mate (base rates were capped between 1% and 99% as participants were informed that this was the
range of possible probabilities). The funneled debriefing, as implemented in Experiment 1 and 2,
revealed that no participants suspected that event base rates were derived from their estimated base
rates.
7.2. Results
7.2.1. Comparison of the two classification schemes
A 3-way ANOVA across the two classification schemes demonstrated a trend level 3-way interac-
tion between Classification Scheme, Event type and Desirability, F(1,28) = 3.40, p = .083, gp2 = .11.
Despite the above interaction failing to attain statistical significance (for the first time), a direct test
for misclassification in the data, again revealed significant evidence for this. As in Experiment 2, we
entered number of trials into a Classification Scheme  Event type  Desirability repeated measures
ANOVA. The three-way interaction between the factors was found to be significant, F(1,31) = 12.15,
p = .001, gp2 = .28, suggesting that a significant proportion of datapoints are misclassified on the per-
sonal risk classification scheme (see Section 3.1). Indeed, per participant, an average of 8/20 negative
events and 5/20 positive events were classified differently under the two classification schemes.
7.2.2. Analysis: personal risk classification scheme
Data from three participants were omitted from analysis as there were no trials in one or more cells
of the design.
Mean updates using the personal risk classification scheme revealed the same asymmetry as
observed in the previous experiments (Fig. 10A). Average updates were entered into a 2 (Event
type)  2 (Desirability) repeated measures ANOVA. Neither the main effect of Event type, F(1,28)
= 3.67, p = .066, gp2 = .12, nor that of Desirability, F(1,28) = 0.39, p = .54, gp2 = .01, was significant.
Once again, there is a flip in asymmetric updating across negative and positive events: the interac-
tion between the factors was significant F(1,28) = 12.80, p = .001, gp2 = .31. This interaction reflected
(non-significant) greater updating in response to desirable than undesirable information when esti-
mating the probability of negative events, t(28) = 1.87, p = .072, d = 0.47, but significantly greater
updating in response to undesirable than desirable information when estimating the likelihood of pos-
itive events, t(28) = 2.14, p = .041, d = 0.37. Analyses including covariates coding for differences in
SE1s, and difference between SE1 and ‘actual’ base rate, across positive and negative events were con-
ducted and produced the same patterns of significance, as did analyses including only uncapped trials.
7.2.3. Analysis: base rate classification scheme
Although the 3-way interaction above failed to attain statistical significance, the pattern of updat-
ing once again appeared somewhat different when trials were classified according to the Base rate
classification scheme (Fig. 10B). Average updates were entered into a 2 (Event type: positive, nega-
tive)  2 (Desirability: desirable, undesirable information) repeated measures ANOVA. The main effect
of Event type, F(1,31) = 0.10, p = .92, gp2 < .01 was not significant. However, the main effect of Desirabil-
ity reached significance, F(1,31) = 5.53, p = .025, gp2 = .15. The interaction between the factors was not
significant in this experiment, F(1,31) = .58, p = .45, gp2 = .02. The main effect of Desirability arose from
participants updating more in response to undesirable than desirable information when estimating the
likelihood of positive events (t(31) = 2.24, p = .033, d = 0.58), although the simple effect did not reach
significance for negative events (t(31) = 1.09, p = .29, d = 0.28). A general optimistic bias clearly cannot
account for these results. In fact, if anything, there is evidence of a ‘pessimism bias’.
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Fig. 10. Mean updates by Event type and Desirability – Experiment 4. (A) Personal risk classification scheme. (B) Base rate
classification scheme. No difference in updating was observed under the base rate classification scheme after the degree of base
rate estimation error was accounted for. Error bars indicate ±1 standard error of the mean. *p < .05, two-tailed.
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not significant (F < 1), but the main effect of desirability remained significant, F(1,30) = 5.34, p = .028,
gp2 = .15. The interaction between the two factors was not (F < 1). This seeming overall ‘pessimism’ was
not, however, significant for either negative (F < 1) or positive events, F(1,30) = 2.78, p = .11, gp2 = .09,
individually.
7.2.4. Analysis: a comparison with rational Bayesian predictions
7.2.4.1. Difference measure. There were no significant main effects of Event type (F < 1), or Desirability,
F(1,31) = 3.74, p = .076, gp2 = .09, and the Event type  Desirability interaction was not significant
(F < 1). There was, however, a trend for participants to be less conservative in their updating in
response to undesirable (M = 2.45 percentage points difference, SE = 0.91) than desirable (M = 4.32
percentage points difference, SE = 0.65) information.
7.2.4.2. Ratio measure. Separate Wilcoxon related-samples signed rank tests were carried out for neg-
ative and positive events. For negative events, there was no effect of Desirability (Z = 1.64, p = .098),
with a trend for less conservative updating in relation to undesirable information (Median = 0.32;
IQR = 1.24) than desirable information (Median = 0.00; IQR = 1.26). For positive events, there was no
effect of Desirability (Z = 1.02, p = .31), but the trend was for less conservative updating in relation
to undesirable information (Median = 0.39; IQR = 1.11) than desirable information (Median = 0.00;
IQR = 0.97).
7.3. Robustness and anticipated objections
Across our experiments we find consistent evidence against ‘optimism’ in both negative and pos-
itive events, with significant interactions by event type (positive vs. negative) in every study. This is
consistent with the statistical artifacts that plague the update method, and it is not consistent with
a genuine optimism account. In a sense, no experimental data are needed to demonstrate that the
update method is flawed – for this, the simulations of Section 3 suffice. Nevertheless, the experiments
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vary in procedural details, sample size, and, to a certain extent, the events included.
Of these factors, the one that should have a large effect on what is observed are the events. This too
should be clear from Section 3. Future life events will inevitably vary in base rate and in the amount of
individual diagnostic information that participants have at their disposal. It is worth stressing this
point once more, because it cuts off a potential line of fruitless debate: namely, the idea that optimism
only fails to emerge for positive events in our experiments because we have somehow not chosen
quite the right events, or because positive events are genuinely different in some other way. ‘‘Unreal-
istic optimism about future life events” (e.g., Weinstein, 1980) should be about exactly that: future life
events, not some future life events on some occasions in some people (Hahn & Harris, 2014). Asym-
metric updating was introduced by Sharot et al. (2011) as a way of explaining ‘‘How unrealistic opti-
mism is maintained in the face of reality” and the same generality should apply here too. Asymmetric
updating simply fails as an explanatory mechanism for generating systematic optimism if it leads to
optimism for some events, but to pessimism for others.
At the same time, it is important to remember that the statistical artifacts will necessarily vary in
expression as a function of events: in other words, it will be possible to find some set of events that
will generate the desired ‘seeming optimism’ both in negative and positive events. Research could
easily converge on ‘just the right’ items, which would give rise to consistent (artifactual) optimism,
if this were a worthwhile goal. The experimental data to date, coupled with the insight provided by
the simulations, would help construct such a set. Fig. 11 shows the distribution of different events
by base rate in Sharot et al.’s seminal (2011) study. As can be seen, they are predominantly rare events,
which will give rise to likelihood ratios below 1 in the majority of participants. And these are the event
characteristics on which we based our simulations.
It must be stressed, however, that while event frequency is important, it does not have the same
direct relationship with artifactual optimism as it does for the classic comparison method of Wein-
stein and colleagues (see Section 3, Harris & Hahn, 2011; Weinstein, 1980). It matters whether events
are above or below 50% (i.e., frequent or rare), but there is no simple relationship between the size of
the artifact introduced by Sharot et al.’s normatively inappropriate procedure and event rarity,
because the magnitude of the base rate error and the exact likelihood ratios (participants’ individual
diagnostic knowledge) matter as well (as the discussion of Table 2 in Section 3 demonstrates).
What should (artifactually) generate reliable ‘optimism’ for positive events, however, is a set of
positive stimuli that was exactly the complement of Sharot et al.’s (2011) set with respect to base
rates, while exactly matched for diagnostic knowledge. In fact, Sharot et al. elicited responses to suchFig. 11. Distribution of event frequencies in Sharot et al. (2011).
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And this is exactly what Sharot et al. found (see Section 2).
In summary, the very nature of the artifacts that plague the update method mean that, given the
right set of events, everything and anything could empirically be found, even in entirely unbiased
agents. As a result, a search for ‘better’ events is not the way to go.
If anything is going to save the update method methodologically, it will have to be new measures
that are calculated from the data. We stressed in Section 3 the limitations of all of the measures we
could think of, including the method of comparing predicted and observed posteriors. Other methods
might yet be found, reviving the paradigm. It would be a great boost to optimism research if this were
possible, but we are presently unaware of an approach that would fit the bill. In this context, it is also
worth discussing the other dependent variable reported in a number of papers using the update
method (including the original, Sharot et al., 2011). This is the ‘learning score’ (Moutsiana et al.,
2013). As indicated in Section 3, the learning score is ‘‘the correlation between estimation errors
and subsequent updates across trials” (Moutsiana et al., 2013, p. 16397), where estimation error is
‘SE1 – actual base rate’ in the current terminology. The simulation presented in Section 3.2, and the
data in Table 2, demonstrate that asymmetric learning scores for desirable versus undesirable trials
also readily arise from unbiased, Bayesian agents. Thus, the learning score is not immune from the
problems identified with the update method. In our experiments, however, we only report update
scores. The reason for this is straightforward. We are concerned with ‘optimistic’ updating. A differ-
ence between the ‘learning scores’ for desirable and undesirable trials does not reflect optimistic
updating, as can be demonstrated through a simple example.
The learning score is a correlation. Any correlation is insensitive to absolute value. It is only the
relationship between the values that is of consequence. Assuming that they are not ‘overshooting’,
an individual who updates three times as much in response to desirable information than undesirable
information should presumably be characterized as optimistically updating (assuming, here, that the
logic for the rest of the method were completely unflawed). This result will not necessarily be
observed in a correlation between initial error and amount of update. If this optimistic updater always
updates 1 unit for every 10 units of initial error in undesirable trials, but in desirable trials they update
3 units for every 10 units of initial error, the learning score (as a correlation) will not distinguish
between these two conditions (both correlations will equal 1).
In other words, the learning score not only shares the problems of update scores, with respect to
the inability to control for both base rate error and individual diagnostic knowledge, but it is also con-
ceptually limited with respect to the question of how people respond to positive as opposed to neg-
ative error signals. Consequently, the search for appropriate measures will need to take other
directions.8. General discussion
The current paper presented a detailed exploration of the phenomenon of optimistic belief updat-
ing in probability estimates through an analysis of the logic of the update method (e.g. Sharot et al.,
2011), simulations and experimental data. Experiment 1 replicated the optimistic updating effect with
estimates about the occurrence of negative events, but showed seeming pessimistic updating with pos-
itive events. Following this, we presented a methodological critique of the updating method and
demonstrated that seemingly optimistic and pessimistic updating could be observed from a simulated
population of rational Bayesian agents. In addition to demonstrating that the original updating task
defines new probability information inappropriately (with information about the base rate defined
as desirable or undesirable based on its relationship with people’s estimates about their own personal
risk, rather than their perception of the base rate), it was shown that the bounded nature of the prob-
ability scale currently prohibits a perfect, principled way of investigating the research question. This is
because diagnostic information that people are in possession of will have differential effects at differ-
ent parts of the probability scale – thus preventing a meaningful comparison between trials on which
event likelihoods are underestimated and those on which they are overestimated. Furthermore, these
effects differ according to the base rates of the events under consideration, as well as the events
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for different people about different events). Consequently, in four further experiments we employed a
range of measures (methods, analyses, events) to provide the most rigorous test to date of the opti-
mistic belief updating hypothesis. Despite the problems inherent in the update method, should a
belief updating pattern consistent with optimism have been observed across a range of different
events and analyses, one may have been tempted to conclude that optimistic belief updating exists.
As Table 3 demonstrates, however, this was not the pattern of results observed. This, coupled with
the simulations of rational Bayesian agents, means that the most parsimonious explanation is that
optimistic belief updating is an artifact of flaws in the methodology used, together with the bounded
nature of the probability scale.
One thing that has been highlighted by our exploration is the importance of recognizing what the
numerical responses obtained from participants represent. In studies that require participants to con-
sider and report their own risk of experiencing real events in the real world, the response from partic-
ipants is more complex than most responses in psychological experiments. Participants’ simple
numerical responses may contain a wealth of information (indeed, the normative theory suggests they
should), all of which is outside of the control, or even knowledge, of the experimenter. Recognizing this
was at the heart of the critique of comparative unrealistic optimism research proffered in Harris
and Hahn (2011). The simulations presented in the current paper again highlight the importance of
considering these factors when determining what can and what cannot be learnt from such
methodologies.
The fact that there is a normative theory of how risk judgments should be made is consequential
both for understanding the task that participants face and for analyzing their responses. Sharot et al.’s
seminal (2011) study overlooks the fact that unbiased, rational participants should combine base rate
information with individual diagnostic knowledge. This not only leads to systematic misclassifications
of participant trials, but also affects the ways in which one can control for random differences in initial
error. One needs to control for (theoretically uninteresting) random differences in participants’ initial
error between desirable and undesirable trials in order for differences in subsequent update to be the-
oretically meaningful. Given that base rate information is the only information provided in these stud-
ies, it is initial base rate error that should be controlled for and thus matched. It might seem intuitive
that, in the absence of other systematic differences, equal amounts of initial base rate error should
result in equal amounts of updating. However, as Section 3.2 showed, once participants have some
individual diagnostic knowledge, it is simply impossible to match participants’ individual diagnostic
information, participants’ base rate error and the amount by which they have to update their beliefs.
Only two of these three can be simultaneously matched across those receiving desirable and undesir-
able information. Consequently, if one matches base rate error and diagnostic information, amount of
update will necessarily be asymmetric. Of course, as soon as base rate error or diagnostic information
differ, the amount of update should differ. This underlines the problems for any attempt to compare
the amount of update across trials in which estimates should move in opposite directions in different
parts of the probability scale, as is the case when comparing the updates of participants receiving
desirable and undesirable information.
In light of these difficulties, it is of critical importance to utilize tests that incorporate a variety of
different events. The inclusion of positive events (with similar base rates to the negative events) can
act as a simple litmus test to determine whether a test is likely demonstrating true evidence of
valence-biased judgment. Of course, it is possible for a genuine result to reveal people to be optimistic
for judgments of negative events and pessimistic for positive events (and vice versa). It should, how-
ever, serve as a warning to thoroughly investigate the characteristics of the methodology used. Sim-
ulations of rational agents being put through the test should yield data that seem indicative of
rationality. If rational agents appear biased, one cannot make any claims from the same pattern of data
obtained from human participants.
The most important inclusion, therefore, in all the studies presented is the positive events. Con-
founds associated with the bounded probability scale are reversed for positive events (as higher
and lower probabilities become more and less desirable events respectively – rather than less and
more, as they are for negative events). Thus, the inclusion of these events is critical to enable any con-
clusion to be drawn whatsoever about optimistic updating (as a general characteristic of human
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such generality see, Hahn & Harris, 2014).
8.1. How do people update their beliefs?
In the simulations reported in this paper, we demonstrate that rational Bayesian agents can pro-
duce data that seem indicative of optimistic belief updating. By definition, these agents are not opti-
mistic, and it thus follows that the same pattern of results cannot necessarily be taken as evidence of
optimism in human participants. This does not, however, necessarily mean that humans are rational
Bayesian agents, and it certainly does not mean that a process account of human belief updating
would resemble Bayes’ Theorem. To our minds, a process account of belief updating is not yet suffi-
ciently developed for it to be utilized in developing a test of optimistic belief updating. Potential can-
didates in the literature for process theories of belief updating include: Explanatory coherence (e.g.,
Thagard, 1989, 2000), averaging processes (e.g., Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009), associative pro-
cesses and natural assessments (e.g., Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010), and Bayesian process models
(e.g., Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010). Any or none of these might subsequently be endorsed as
the underlying process of human belief updating.
The fact that we do not know whether or not people update as Bayesian agents, however, is moot
with respect to the role of the simulations in the present paper. The central conclusion that has pre-
viously been reached from studies using the update method is that human belief updating is (typi-
cally) optimistic, in that people update more in response to desirable information than undesirable
information (with negative events). This conclusion relies on the assumption that non-optimistic
agents would update equally in response to desirable and undesirable information. Bayesian agents
are not optimistic. That simulations with Bayesian agents show unequal belief updating in response
to desirable and undesirable information thus demonstrates that this critical assumption of the update
method does not hold.
Without that critical assumption, however, none of the further empirical conclusions that research
within update paradigm has put forward can be maintained. It becomes entirely unclear, for example,
what the neural correlates represent, what L-DOPAmoderates in this context, or what effects of ageing
on updating are (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012;
Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012; Sharot et al., 2007, 2011). At the same time, the simulations make clear that
the mere fact that ‘optimistic updating’ is subject to moderation by TMS (Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012), L-
DOPA (Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012), age (Chowdhury et al., 2014), or even the presence of
depressive symptoms (Garrett et al., 2014) does not imply that the effect is somehow real. As the sharp
boundaries seen in Fig. 3 (Section 3.1) above demonstrated, any change in participants’ perception of
the underlying probabilistic quantities or the degree of noise with which participants report them, is
likely to give rise to seemingly ‘qualitative’ differences. It remains entirely possible that any or all of
these identified moderators do increase or decrease optimism, but this conclusion cannot be made
from the extant data using this methodology. All of this serves to illustrate the extent to which any
process level analysis can proceed only with a full understanding of the nature of the task at a com-
putational level which draws out the task requirements, the goals of the individual and how these are
optimally achieved (see also e.g., Oaksford, 2015).
8.2. Unrealistic optimism about future events?
Finally, our results have a number of implications for the current debate about unrealistic opti-
mism itself. In that debate, there are presently a number of fundamental questions about unrealistic
optimism that must be resolved. It is beyond doubt that the standard method of optimism research,
the comparative method (Weinstein, 1980), generates data that seem indicative of unrealistic opti-
mism for negative events. Regardless of the appropriate interpretation of these data, at a group level
participants rate themselves as less likely than the average person to experience adverse future life
events. Yet the following three, interrelated, questions are presently without compelling answer:
(1) how is that pattern brought about? (2) does it reflect optimism on the part of the participants?
and (3) if yes, is that optimism an instance of a general optimistic bias with adaptive properties?
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Brown, 1988) straightforwardly says ‘yes’ to (2) and (3), and implies a valence-based mechanism such
as motivated reasoning that will reliably generate optimism to underlie (1) (Kunda, 1990; Lench &
Bench, 2012; Weinstein, 1984). However, a number of alternative proposals for mechanism exist in
the literature, which maintain that comparative optimism may arise from general (non-
motivational) constraints on the comparison process. On the egocentrism account (e.g., Chambers
et al., 2003), it is the fact that participants will naturally focus on themselves and their own individ-
uating information that gives rise to comparative optimism. On the differential regression account
(Moore & Healy, 2008; Moore & Small, 2008), it is the fact that participants have more accurate knowl-
edge about the self than about the average person that gives rise to the discrepancy. On these
accounts, participants may be comparatively optimistic (i.e., a ‘yes’ to (2) above), but may, on other
occasions, equally show comparative pessimism (as is indeed observed for positive events of compa-
rable frequency, Chambers et al., 2003; Harris, 2009; Kruger & Burrus, 2004; Moore & Small, 2008),
thus rejecting a general optimism bias (saying ‘no’ to 3). The statistical artifact hypothesis (Harris &
Hahn, 2011), finally, suggests that the seeming comparative optimism seen in traditional optimism
studies merely reflects artifactual, method-based distortions of what are actually unbiased responses.
The present results are relevant to each of these three questions and these different accounts. A
demonstration of (seeming) robust pessimism for positive events (as observed in four out of our five
studies under the personal risk classification) is incompatible with the idea that there is a general, self-
protective optimism bias and is also incompatible with any kind of motivated reasoning account. Iron-
ically then, our critique of the methodology, which questions the meaning of this ‘pessimism’, is the
thing that keeps these accounts alive. Only these methodological limitations prevent a firm conclusion
that participants’ belief updating is pessimistic for positive events, which would have ruled out such
accounts. The lack of definitive evidence for pessimistic updating allows, at least in principle, that a
general optimistic bias may be generated by means other than differential updating. Of course, it con-
tinues to be unexplained on such an account, however, why the comparative method (e.g., Weinstein,
1980) yields pessimism for rare positive events (Chambers et al., 2003; Harris, 2009; Kruger & Burrus,
2004; Moore & Small, 2008).
8.2.1. Implications for automatic optimism
The failure to find any evidence for optimistic belief updating does, however, present a serious
challenge to one particular motivational account: Lench and colleagues’ ‘automatic optimism’
(Lench, 2009; Lench & Bench, 2012; Lench & Ditto, 2008). This account assumes that optimism
arises from automatic affective responding. Specifically, people make use of an ‘optimism heuristic’.
People ‘‘simply decide that events that elicit positive affective reactions are likely to occur and
events that elicit negative affective reactions are unlikely to occur” (Lench & Bench, 2012, p. 351)
as a default reaction when they experience approach or avoidance reactions to future events.
In particular, this means that participants will interpret base rates optimistically (Lench & Ditto,
2008). In support, Lench and Ditto (2008) provided participants with matched positive and negative
future life events, for which participants were given equal base rates. Participants then rated their
own chance of experiencing that event. In a direct comparison, the mean estimates for negative events
were lower than for the matched positive events, suggesting optimism.
In principle, this is an interesting test, because it does not rely on the comparative method. But one
cannot test for optimism in this way unless – as an experimenter – one’s knowledge of the base rate is
entirely accurate, and these true base rates are exactly equal across conditions. This is patently not the
case in Lench and Ditto’s (2008) design, because they used negation to generate corresponding nega-
tive (‘will get cancer’) and positive (‘will not get cancer’) events.
Complementary events can be equiprobable only if their base rate is exactly 50%. However, this is
not the case for events such as ‘getting cancer’, ‘owning one’s own home’, ‘at some point being unem-
ployed’, or ‘developing asthma’ as used by Lench and Ditto (2008). That participants are told equiva-
lent base rates is immaterial here, because the distribution of participants’ individual diagnostic
knowledge will be governed by the true base rate (precisely because that knowledge is diagnostic).
For example, cancer has a life-time prevalence of about 40%, so most people will genuinely not get
cancer. By the same token, more people will possess diagnostic knowledge indicating lower risk than
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and Appendix D). This means that averages across estimates of individual risk will deviate from the
experimenter provided base rate even if participants fully believe that base rate and incorporate it into
their own prediction. Once more, it is critically important not to lose sight of what these numbers
actually represent for participants in the real world.
8.2.2. Implications for Harris and Hahn’s (2011) statistical artifact hypothesis
Needless to say, evidence for a genuine desirability bias in belief updating would have conflicted
with the statistical artifact hypothesis concerning comparative optimism. Selectively revising beliefs
in response to desirable as opposed to undesirable information would drive down estimates of indi-
vidual risk for negative events relative to what they should be (and raise those estimates for positive
events). On average, over time, this would give rise to genuine comparative optimism. The examina-
tion of optimistic belief updating conducted here thus presents one critical test of the statistical arti-
fact hypothesis. The failure to find any evidence of selective updating is in line with that hypothesis.
The experiments reported here also provide indirect evidence supporting the statistical artifact
account. Harris and Hahn (2011) showed through simulation that the comparative method makes
entirely rational agents seem optimistically biased. This renders useless the evidence from compara-
tive tests, because one cannot establish the existence of irrational bias with measures that yield seem-
ingly biased data from unbiased agents. This, however, leaves open the extent to which participants
actually are unbiased agents, and whether there is also genuine optimism influencing the outcome
of such tests. In order for it to be the case that statistical artifacts are all there is to comparative opti-
mism data, participants must share some of the fundamental characteristics of rational Bayesian
agents. While they need in no way be perfect Bayesians, participants would have to be sensitive to
base rates, possess individuating knowledge, and make use of both in their estimates of personal risk.
The statistical artifacts identified by Harris and Hahn (2011) would exert no effect if participants felt
they had no individuating knowledge with which to distinguish themselves from the base rate (the
average person’s risk). The same is true if they were entirely unaware of base rates, or failed to incor-
porate them into their own estimates of personal risk as has sometimes been claimed (e.g., Kahneman
& Tversky, 1973; but see also Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Welsh & Navarro, 2012). The data from Exper-
iments 2–4 make clear that this is not the case. People readily incorporate a new base rate into their
distinct estimate of individual risk. Though one cannot, at this point, conclude that comparative opti-
mism is solely a statistical artifact, it remains entirely possible that it is.
8.2.3. A broader perspective on unrealistic optimism
Against this conjecture it may seem tempting to argue that support for a genuine optimistic bias
may be drawn from other sources that do not involve estimates of risk (Dunning, Heath, & Suls,
2004). Specifically, unrealistic optimism about risks for future events is often linked to an array of
self-serving biases, including overconfidence (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Lichtenstein,
Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982) and the better-than-average effect (e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher,
Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Svenson, 1981). If there is robust evidence of very broad self-
enhancement biases, one may be inclined to consider it unlikely that unrealistic optimism does not
in fact exist. However, these other biases have also drawn critical attention, with their classification
as self-enhancement biases questioned by a significant number of researchers (e.g., on overconfi-
dence: Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2011; Moore & Healy, 2008; Pfeifer,
1994; Soll, 1996. On the better-than-average effect: Benoit & Dubra, 2011; Galesic, Olsson, &
Rieskamp, 2012; Kruger, 1999; Kruger, Windschitl, Burrus, Fessel, & Chambers, 2008; Moore &
Healy, 2008; Moore & Small, 2007). It could also be argued that unrealistic optimism is related to gen-
eral self-serving biases in belief updating, such as a selective failure to incorporate negative informa-
tion pertaining to one’s own attractiveness (Eil & Rao, 2011).
However, even if the preceding biases are found to be robust (and recent studies controlling for
extant critiques suggest this may be true for certain types of overconfidence: Benoit, Dubra, &
Moore, 2015; Mannes & Moore, 2013; Merkle & Weber, 2011), there is no reason why risk estimates
should be optimistic. There might be little harm in overestimating one’s own physical attractiveness. It
might even be beneficial for ‘‘high ability” college students to conservatively update their expectations
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Logg, & Moore, 2015, for the possibility that research might have exaggerated the potential for such
a benefit), so as to maintain motivation and subsequently maximize future earnings. One can argue,
however, that such optimism is likely to be more harmful when estimating risk. The costs associated
with underestimating the probability of a negative event will often be greater than the costs associ-
ated with overestimating it, as people will not take the necessary protective behaviors (e.g., Harris,
Corner, & Hahn, 2009; Weber, 1994) (‘‘people who play down the seriousness of early symptoms of
severe diseases such as skin cancer. . .may literally pay with their lives for their motivated reasoning”;
Kunda, 1990, p. 496).
Estimates of the probability of experiencing future life events may be viewed not only in a broader
context of potentially self-enhancing biases, but also within the broader context of research on prob-
ability judgment. In the same way that there exists a wider literature on self-enhancement, there
exists a broader literature examining the effects of desirability on estimates of probability, and the
broader picture emerging from that literature seems equally relevant.
Here, research on unrealistic optimism naturally links to a broader swathe of research that is usu-
ally brought under the banner of ‘wishful thinking’. Across a variety of paradigms investigating like-
lihood judgments for future events, some researchers have reported evidence for optimism (e.g., Irwin,
1953; Lench, 2009; Pruitt & Hoge, 1965), some have demonstrated that negative events are overesti-
mated (suggesting pessimism) (Bilgin, 2012; Harris et al., 2009; Risen & Gilovich, 2007), some have
demonstrated an overestimate of both positive and negative events (Vosgerau, 2010; but see de
Molière & Harris, 2016), whilst others have observed no effect of outcome utility, or established that
a seeming effect of outcome utility is merely an effect of salience (Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Bar-
Hillel, Budescu, & Amar, 2008). Given the discrepancy of research findings, and alternative interpreta-
tions of many ‘optimistic’ findings to date (e.g., Bar-Hillel et al., 2008; Harris et al., 2009; Windschitl,
Smith, Rose, & Krizan, 2010; see also, Krizan & Windschitl, 2007), systematic research into this area
identifying clear methods is of paramount importance. At present, however, it seems, to us, premature
to conclude that people’s judgments of probability are systematically prone to ‘wishful thinking’.
Viewed from the wider perspective of judgment and decision-making research, the evidence for unre-
alistic optimism is far from overwhelming.
Although we – on the basis of the divergent findings cited above, Harris and Hahn’s (2011) critique,
and the present studies – doubt the existence of a general optimistic bias, it is almost certainly the
case that there will be optimism in specific cases. Specific groups of people, for example smokers
(Arnett, 2000; Weinstein, 1998) and gamblers (Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004), might be more opti-
mistic than others. People also might be optimistic about specific things. For example, there has been
convincing evidence of ‘costly’ optimism in sports fans (Babad & Katz, 1991; Massey, Simmons, &
Armor, 2011; Simmons & Massey, 2012; but see, Bar-Hillel et al., 2008).
Moreover, beyond the domain of future life events, people might be overoptimistic about specific
things because they are, in fact, optimistic in their updating. Evidence for optimistic updating has, for
example, been found in people’s perceptions of their attractiveness (Eil & Rao, 2011), personal traits
(e.g., Korn, Prehn, Park, Walter, & Heekeren, 2012), and their intelligence (Eil & Rao, 2011; Mobius,
Niederle, Niehaus, & Rosenblat, 2011). Once more, it is important to bear in mind the fundamental dif-
ferences between personal risk and things such as attractiveness or personal traits. This matters
because Kunda (1990), in her seminal review of motivated reasoning, stressed that people will be
more likely to arrive at desired conclusions only if they are able to construct or retrieve evidence in
their support which is further helped by properties such as stimulus ambiguity (cf. Ditto & Lopez,
1992; Dunning et al., 1989). Multifaceted concepts such as (unspecific) intelligence and attractiveness
can be interpreted in many ways, which is not the case for whether or not a person will contract can-
cer. As just discussed, wishful thinking has proved difficult to establish in the judgment and decision-
making literature. This literature makes use of minimal materials that are aimed at demonstrating a
pure desirability bias that does not rest on the fact that biased evidence has been accumulated. The
current studies involving the update method share the same fundamental characteristics: participants
are provided with a single, simple statistic about the event base rate, that it seems impossible to con-
strue in more than one way. It is thus entirely in keeping with the findings of both the judgment and
decision-making literature (discussed above) and the literature on motivated reasoning that no opti-
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future life events. This may also turn out to be brought about by updating asymmetries. However,
the literature on motivated reasoning itself suggests that such asymmetries (and resultant bias) are
likely to be found only in far richer information contexts – contexts that can be interpreted in a variety
of different ways.
We conclude, therefore, that there is presently no compelling evidence for a fundamental optimism
bias by which people, in general, are optimistic about future life events, in general. Until new, inde-
pendent evidence for such a bias can be obtained, it seems prudent to revert to an accurate perception
of reality as our gold standard for mental health (see also, Colvin & Block, 1994), rather than assuming
that optimism is a general human trait that promotes mental wellbeing (e.g., Sharot, 2012; Taylor &
Brown, 1988).
8.3. Conclusion
In light of recent critiques, new tests of optimism are of great interest, especially given their appli-
cation to real-world decision making in the fields of health and finance. A recent test (Chowdhury
et al., 2014; Garrett & Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015,
2016; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, et al., 2012; Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012; Sharot
et al., 2011) was shown to be inappropriate in its original formulation. A detailed analysis highlighted
further difficulties inherent in assessing the (ir)rationality of belief updating about real-world events
in this and other contexts. Five experiments tested for optimistic belief updating through the use of a
variety of events (both positive and negative) and via a number of analyses. Overall, no evidence for
optimistic updating was observed. The results of Sharot and colleagues thus do not provide additional
evidence in favor of a general human optimistic tendency. Furthermore, even if subsequent research
does point to the universality of unrealistic optimism, the underlying mechanisms and neurobiology
supporting the phenomenon remain unknown.
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Appendix A. Life events – Experiment 1
A warm sunny day in winter
Appendicitis
Attending a friend’s birthday party
Being blackmailed
Being cheated on by partner
Being convicted of crime
Being fired
Being in unmanageable debt
Being offered a seat on a busy train
Being on the queen’s birthday honours list (OBE/CBE/Knighthood)
Being told you are special
(continued on next page)
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Bone fracture
Buying a new home
Cancer (of digestive system/lung/prostate/breast/skin)
Vehicle (car/bike) stolen
Card fraud
Chronic high blood pressure
Computer crash with loss of important data
Constant healthy weight for 10 years
Death before 70
Death by infection
Death of a pet animal
Deep vein thrombosis/blot clot in vein
Dementia
Divorce
Domestic burglary
Eating at your favourite restaurant
Falling down stairs
Family visit you at Christmas
Finding money in a coat pocket
Finding something valuable you thought you had lost
Fraud when buying something on the internet
Free trip around the world
Getting a large bonus payment at work
Getting a new pet animal
Getting engaged/married
Getting severely sunburnt
Going to a movie premiere
Having a book/article published
Having a child
Having a stroke
Heart failure
Helped by a stranger when you need it
House vandalized
Inheriting a fortune unexpectedly
Limb amputation
Living healthily past 80
Losing wallet
Marrying someone wealthy
Meeting a member of the royal family
Miss a flight
Mouse/rat in house
Not getting ill all winter
Parkinson’s disease
Promotion/new job
Receiving a present
Receiving an unexpected discount on a purchase
Running a profitable business
Running into a long lost friend
Seeing someone famous while on public transport
Severe injury due to accident (traffic or house)
Sexual dysfunction
Ta
Ex
Ta
Ex
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Theft from person
Upgraded to first class on a flight
Theft from vehicle
Victim of bullying at work (nonphysical)
Victim of mugging
Victim of violence by acquaintance
Victim of violence by stranger
Victim of violence with need to go to A&E
Winning a prize in a media (TV/radio/newspaper) competition
Winning a race
Winning a raffle at a fair
Winning a raffle for a convertible sports car
Winning an all-expenses paid holiday
Winning an award in recognition of your work
Witnessing a traumatising accident
Your achievements in newspaperA.1. Life events used during practice trials
Glaucoma
Winning the lotteryAppendix B. Descriptive statistics for estimates (not updates) in all experiments
Events coded as desirable or undesirable on the personal risk classification scheme. Actual BR is the
base rate information provided to the participants by the experimenter. SE1 is initial personal risk
estimate, SE2 is the updated estimate of personal risk. BR1 is initial base rate estimate, BR2 is the sec-
ond base rate estimate. Mean estimates and standard deviations (in parentheses) were, like belief
updates, calculated by averaging information about each trial type at the group level (see Tables
B1–B5).ble B1
periment 1.
Positive events Negative events
Undesirable trials Desirable trials Overall Undesirable trials Desirable trials Overall
Actual BR 28.39 (7.28) 38.00 (12.70) 33.20 (6.47) 35.30 (14.05) 22.19 (9.87) 28.74 (11.30)
SE1 39.46 (9.87) 31.43 (12.36) 35.44 (7.28) 28.65 (11.93) 30.45 (12.77) 29.55 (11.62)
SE2 33.08 (8.90) 33.79 (11.88) 33.43 (6.41) 30.31 (13.06) 24.55 (11.42) 27.43 (11.67)
ble B2
periment 2.
Positive events Negative events
Undesirable trials Desirable trials Overall Undesirable trials Desirable trials Overall
Actual BR 21.17 (7.59) 37.80 (15.07) 29.48 (10.52) 32.10 (15.07) 16.24 (8.55) 24.17 (10.87)
BR1 33.33 (9.88) 28.24 (12.08) 30.79 (10.38) 24.53 (12.32) 26.72 (12.48) 25.62 (11.90)
SE1 28.21 (11.14) 31.53 (12.39) 29.87 (10.74) 26.60 (12.89) 20.66 (12.34) 23.63 (11.17)
SE2 22.72 (10.35) 32.76 (14.21) 27.74 (11.05) 24.62 (13.58) 15.08 (9.40) 19.85 (10.22)
Table B3
Experiment 3A.
Positive events Negative events
Undesirable trials Desirable trials Overall Undesirable trials Desirable trials Overall
Actual BR 15.28 (5.25) 31.90 (7.74) 22.25 (1.63) 32.27 (3.94) 15.16 (2.33) 23.22 (0.93)
BR1 33.64 (7.40) 17.90 (5.89) 26.72 (5.37) 14.12 (3.42) 31.74 (5.60) 23.29 (4.93)
SE1 33.78 (10.92) 20.53 (10.06) 27.98 (9.17) 13.27 (5.67) 28.42 (9.31) 21.20 (7.55)
BR2 17.79 (7.01) 31.86 (8.74) 23.83 (4.63) 28.89 (6.53) 20.77 (5.72) 24.50 (4.92)
SE2 22.01 (11.09) 28.94 (10.80) 25.07 (8.48) 22.51 (8.16) 19.87 (8.29) 21.03 (7.32)
Table B4
Experiment 3B.
Positive events Negative events
Undesirable trials Desirable trials Overall Undesirable trials Desirable trials Overall
Actual BR 16.40 (5.09) 30.59 (8.70) 21.98 (1.49) 31.07 (4.89) 15.24 (2.64) 22.72 (1.27)
BR1 35.93 (8.84) 17.53 (8.08) 28.58 (7.31) 13.83 (4.20) 32.97 (6.81) 23.92 (6.88)
SE1 35.55 (13.40) 20.58 (12.17) 29.51 (11.42) 13.71 (7.52) 29.54 (9.28) 21.93 (8.82)
BR2 19.74 (6.38) 29.42 (10.19) 23.62 (4.42) 26.38 (7.09) 21.67 (6.11) 23.87 (5.13)
SE2 23.64 (11.09) 26.70 (11.62) 25.06 (8.96) 20.95 (8.80) 20.72 (8.67) 20.80 (7.93)
Table B5
Experiment 4.
Positive events Negative events
Desirable trials Undesirable trials Overall Desirable trials Undesirable trials Overall
Actual BR 30.66 (13.83) 23.46 (8.20) 27.06 (8.42) 24.37 (10.23) 38.78 (14.43) 31.58 (11.44)
BR1 25.47 (11.48) 30.04 (10.66) 27.75 (8.36) 31.00 (13.15) 31.94 (11.96) 31.47 (11.61)
SE1 28.23 (16.07) 35.73 (14.74) 31.98 (12.73) 25.64 (9.86) 26.94 (9.25) 26.29 (8.67)
SE2 28.50 (16.75) 31.33 (12.77) 29.92 (12.35) 24.25 (8.72) 30.42 (13.37) 27.34 (9.34)
116 P. Shah et al. / Cognitive Psychology 90 (2016) 71–127Appendix C. Additional analyses – descriptive statistics by Event type and Desirability in
Experiment 1Positive events Negative eventsDesirable
trialsUndesirable
trialsDesirable
trialsUndesirable
trialsNumber of excluded capped
trials6.92 (3.28) 3.23 (1.92) 2.69 (2.93) 4.38 (3.93)Memory errora 6.14 (3.47) 7.42 (2.98) 6.11 (2.04) 7.57 (2.66)
Vividness 3.68 (0.93) 3.76 (1.01) 3.34 (0.90) 3.41 (0.80)
Experience 1.94 (0.49) 2.10 (0.39) 1.31 (0.18) 1.41 (0.25)
Arousal 3.59 (0.71) 3.31 (0.86) 3.27 (1.19) 3.44 (1.25)
Magnitude of valence 3.94 (0.73) 4.03 (0.67) 4.31 (0.66) 4.50 (0.64)Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
a Memory errors were calculated as the mean absolute difference between the recalled value and the actual probability.
Appendix D. Normative foundations and limitations of the revised update method, using the
personal risk classification scheme
The basic logic of the update method, illustrated schematically in Fig. D1, runs as follows: For an
event of given base rate, individuals in the population will over- or under-estimate that base rate to
Fig. D1. For an event with true base rate of .4 (i.e., the event will ultimately be experienced by 40% of the population), indicated
by the dashed line, individuals in the population will over- or under-estimate that base rate to a certain extent. On receipt of
information about the true base rate, these individuals should adopt that new, correct base rate, thus changing their beliefs in
the direction indicated by the arrows.
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that new, correct base rate, thus changing their beliefs in the direction indicated by the arrows. In
the case of negative events, those over-estimating the base rate will receive ‘desirable information’
indicating that the true risk is lower, whereas those under-estimating will receive ‘undesirable infor-
mation’. For positive events, the valence of over- and under-estimates is reversed.
Of course, as outlined in the manuscript, participants will also frequently be in possession of indi-
viduating information, according to which they may conclude that, normatively, their individual risk
lies above or below the (estimated) base rate: Someone not in possession of a bicycle is entitled to
believe that their risk of experiencing a bicycle theft lies below the base rate, that is, the risk of the
average person.
In a population of rational agents, who derive their own risk from the base rate in accordance with
Bayes’ theorem, the mean individual risk estimate will correspond to the base rate (see also Harris and
Hahn, 2011), which is one of the reasons why Bayes’ theorem is viewed as normative. Specifically, the
mean individual risk estimate is the average across the responses of those people receiving a positive
test result and those receiving a negative test result, for some diagnostic ‘test’ (individuating piece of
knowledge such as family history) ‘e’. These averages are obtained by multiplying the respective pos-
terior degrees of belief (Eqs. (D1) and (D2)) with the proportions of people expressing them (Eqs. (D3)
and (D4)). It can be seen from Eqs. (D1) and (D3) and from Eqs. (D2) and (D4) that this multiplication
process will cancel out the denominators in Eqs. (D1) and (D4), leaving the average response of the
population equal to Eq. (D5). As Pð:ejhÞ and PðejhÞmust sum to 1, Eq. (7) reduces to PðhÞ, which equals
the base rate.PðhjeÞ ¼ PðhÞPðejhÞ
PðhÞPðejhÞ þ Pð:hÞPðej:hÞ ðD1Þ
Pðhj:eÞ ¼ PðhÞPð:ejhÞ
Pð:hÞPð:ej:hÞ þ PðhÞPð:ej:hÞ ðD2Þ
PðhÞPðejhÞ þ Pð:hÞPðej:hÞ ðD3Þ
PðhÞPð:ejhÞ þ Pð:hÞPð:ej:hÞ ðD4Þ
PðhÞPð:ejhÞ þ PðhÞPðejhÞ ðD5Þ
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edge average out in this way, the individuating knowledge of individuals cancels out.
However, a caveat arises from the fact that participants’ base rate estimates are mistaken. As
pointed out by Harris and Hahn (2011), individuating knowledge is dispensed ‘by the world’ and thus
reflects the true, underlying base rate, not the base rate (erroneously) assumed by participants. This
will give rise to systematic deviations between the mean base rate estimate and the mean estimate
of individual risk. Where the base rate is over-estimated, the mean individual risk estimate will lie
below the estimated base rate thus (falsely) suggesting individuals are ‘optimistic’. Where the base
rate is under-estimated, the mean individual risk estimate will lie above. These relationships are illus-
trated in the panel plots of Fig. D2.
Notably, it is a consequence of the bounded nature of the probability scale that the change scores
for base rate over- and under-estimators who are in possession of diagnostic knowledge about their
own individual risk only approximately balance out. Where that knowledge is very diagnostic, and
the deviation from the true base rate sizeable, under-estimators who are otherwise entirely rational
will exhibit larger amounts of absolute change in incorporating the new base rate (see bottom right
hand panel of Fig. D2). For values of sensitivity and specificity that govern the diagnosticity of individ-
uals’ risk relevant knowledge or ‘tests’, where the likelihood ratio is 1, the update scores for over- and
under-estimators will be exactly equal, as can be seen in the landscape plot Fig. D3 Panels A and B.Fig. D2. The panel plots illustrate how groups of rational agents who over- and under-estimate the base rate will come to
deviate from their respective population base rate (mis)estimates in their estimates of individual risk. The top left hand plot
recapitulates Fig. D1, and represents the true base rate (dotted line), as well as over- and under-estimates of that base rate. Here
the true base rate equals .3, over-and under-estimates range from .05 to .30 respectively. The middle panel of the top row shows
for each level of base rate mis-estimate, the resulting estimates of individual risk for those in receipt of a positive test result (‘+’)
and those in receipt of a negative test result (‘o’) for a hypothetical test of sensitivity, P(e|h), = .7 and specificity, P(:e|:h), = .7.
Estimates of individual risk are derived using Eqs. (D1) and (D2). The top right panel shows the average (dashed line) of these
estimates within the group (assuming representative sampling). As indicated in the text, this average lies below the group’s
mis-estimated base rate. Bottom left and middle panels show the corresponding plots for base rate under-estimators. The
bottom right hand plot, finally, combines this information to generate the aggregate plot: as can be seen the mean individual
risk estimates of over- and under-estimators (dashed lines) deviate from the over- and under-estimators assumed base rates.
Fig. D3. The figure plots the extent to which the absolute update scores of rational agents who are mistaken only about the base
rate differ between base rate over- and under-estimators. x- and y-axes represent sensitivity and specificity of the diagnostic
‘test’. The z axis (‘Change score bias’) shows the degree to which the change scores of the under-estimators exceed those of the
over-estimators. Panel A plots the space for a ‘true’ base rate = .50, under- and over-estimates deviate from this by ±.15. Panel B
plots the corresponding space for a true base rate of .25 as in Table 1. Note also the smoothness in contrast with the space that
arises with misclassifications as shown in Fig. 3.
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levels of sensitivity and selectivity. Note also that those regions of the parameter space where the
false positive rate exceeds the hit rate of the test (i.e., Pð:ejhÞ > PðejhÞ) imply a test whose mean-
ing is reversed.
The inclusion of both negative and positive events guarantees that, even in the case where
update scores are unequal in magnitude, the imbalance that arises for over- and under-
estimates is un-confounded from what is psychologically ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ information
(see Fig. D4) – further highlighting the importance of including both positive and negative events
in these studies.
undesirable desirable undesirable desirable
negative positive
Fig. D4. Schematic illustration of outcomes of a change score test where absolute change scores deviate between rational over-
and under-estimators of the base rate. In the case of negative events, under-estimates correspond to ‘undesirable information’.
However, for positive events, under-estimators will be receiving ‘desirable information’.
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A healthy child born in the family
A warm sunny day in winter
Accidentally putting electronic device in washing machine
Attending a family member’s wedding
Being applauded
Being arrested
Being asked on a date by someone you are attracted to
Being cheated on by partner
Being in unmanageable debt
Being offered a seat on a busy train
Being sent a gift from an anonymous sender
Being sworn at in public
Being told you are special
Being told you look attractive/handsome
Bone fracture
Buying a new home
Cancer (of digestive system/lung/prostate/breast/skin)
Card fraud
Chronic high blood pressure
Computer crash with permanent loss of all data
Constant healthy weight for 10 years
Death before 70
Death by infection
Dementia
Domestic burglary
Falling down stairs
Family throw you a surprise party
Finding £10 or more lying on the street
Finding something valuable you thought you had lost
Food poisoning with need to visit doctor
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Get trapped in a lift
Getting a large bonus payment at work
Getting a new pet animal
Getting an all-expenses paid holiday
Getting severely sunburnt
Getting unexpected tax break/benefit payment
Given complimentary dessert at a restaurant
Going to a movie premiere
Having a book/article published
Having a stroke
Hearing your favourite song in a public place (e.g. restaurant/shop)
Heart failure
Helped by a stranger when you need it
House vandalised
Living healthily past 80
Losing mobile phone
Losing wallet
Making a profit when selling a valuable item
Meet someone who likes the same things as you
Meeting a member of the royal family
Miss a flight
Miss the bus/train home
Mouse/rat in house
Not getting ill all winter
Parkinson’s disease
Pet animal injured
Promotion without applying for one
Raise over £1000 for charity
Receiving an inheritance from unknown family member
Receiving an unexpected discount on a purchase
Seeing someone famous while on public transport
Severe injury due to accident (traffic or house)
Sexual dysfunction
Theft from person
Theft from vehicle
Unexpectedly meeting an old schoolmate
Upgraded to first class on a flight
Vehicle (car/bike) stolen
Victim of bullying at work (nonphysical)
Victim of mugging
Victim of violence by acquaintance
Victim of violence by stranger
Victim of violence with need to go to A&E
Winning a prize in a media (TV/radio/newspaper) competition
Winning a race
Winning a raffle at a fair
Winning an award in recognition of your work
Witnessing a traumatising accident
Your achievements in newspaper
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Glaucoma
Winning the lotteryAppendix F. Life events and provided base rate statistics – Experiment 3
37 Negative events (provided risk for average person [percentage] in the right column):Theft from a vehicle 76
Liver Disease 8
Dying before 80 41
Anxiety Disorder 13
Bone Fracture 38
Alzheimer’s Disease 6
Heart Failure 31
Kidney Stones 10
Clinical obesity 30
Artificial Joint 11
Cancer of Digestive system 13
Chronic high blood pressure 20
Lung cancer 6
Type II diabetes 27
Dying before 70 18
Violence from a stranger 26
Severe insomnia 11
Spinal cord disease 13
Stroke 17
Prostate/breast cancer 5
Serious hearing problem 14
Violence from an acquaintance 28
Car theft 15
Abnormal heart rhythm 24
Dementia 13
Divorce 45
Gallbladder stones 10
Cancer 40
House vandalised 80
Hepatitis A/B 36
Tinnitus 8
Theft from person 45
Dying before 60 8
Alcoholism 7
Cataract 65
Skin cancer 3
Parkinson’s Disease 4
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Marry a millionaire 3
Like first job after university 54
Have a starting salary greater than £40,000 7
Not spend a night in hospital in the next 5 years 55
Receive nationwide recognition within a profession 3
Have a starting salary greater than £20,000 55
Have an achievement recognised in the national press 3
Have a mentally gifted child 7
Visit the Amazonian rainforest 5
Be earning more than £80,000 in 10 years’ time 2
Home’s value doubles in any 5 year period 15
Have a starting salary greater than £30,000 16
Live past 90 years old 11
Receive a good job offer before graduating 17
Maintain a constant weight for the next 10 years 26
Last the whole of next winter without being ill 20
Graduate with a first 33
Have one’s work recognised with an award 6Appendix G. Life events and provided base rate statistics – Experiment 4Positive
Be earning more than £80,000 in 10 years’ time 2
Marry a millionaire 3
Receive nationwide recognition within a profession 3
Have an achievement recognised in the national press 3
Visit the Amazonian rainforest 5
Have one’s work recognised with an award 6
Have a starting salary greater than £40,000 7
Have a mentally gifted child 7
Live past 90 years old 11
Home’s value doubles in any 5 year period 15
Have a starting salary greater than £30,000 16
Receive a good job offer before graduating 17
Last the whole of next winter without being ill 20
Graduate with a first 23
Maintain a constant weight for the next 10 years 26
Professional or managerial job after graduating 45
Like first job after university 54
Not spend a night in hospital in the next 5 years 55
Have a starting salary greater than £20,000 55
Own own home 82Negative
Skin cancer 3
Parkinson’s Disease 4(continued on next page)
124 P. Shah et al. / Cognitive Psychology 90 (2016) 71–127Breast cancer 5
Lung cancer 6
Liver Disease 8
Dying before 60 8
Kidney Stones 10
Severe insomnia 11
Anxiety Disorder 13
Spinal cord disease 13
Dementia 13
Car theft 15
Chronic high blood pressure 20
Abnormal heart rhythm 24
Violence from a stranger 26
Type II diabetes 27
Clinical obesity 30
Cataract 65
Theft from a vehicle 76
House vandalised 80References
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